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Abstract: For a research project I engaged in from 2004-2007, I gathered and analysed 
statements made by representatives of Islamist terrorist movements on the Internet and 
compared key themes of their ideology (such as "democracy", "capitalism", "globalization", 
"colonialism" and "underdevelopment") to the writings and ideology of authors in various 
traditions of Christian "political theology". In this paper, it is being established that there 
are clear similarities in the socio-political analysis advanced by Christian political and 
liberation theologians and representatives of Islamist terrorist movements and radical 
Islam, respectively. The paper also offers a short history and extended discussion of the 
concept of "political theology" and elaborates on radical Islam's understanding of theology 
and politics. Primary and secondary literature on Christian and Islamic political and 
liberation theologies and radical Islam are being reviewed (including the most recent 
writings on "political theology" emanating from, mainly leftist, theory circles in Europe and 
the US). In an attempt to expand the term "political theology" to cover the socio-political 
analysis, arguments, and ideology of radical Islam, anti-liberalism is revealed as the single 
most important factor underlying all political theology. The argument is made that being 
anti-liberal means being (at least potentially) anti-democratic as well. A discussion of future 
lines of academic inquiry opens up the possibility of a common definition or framework 
covering all forms of political and liberation theologies and asks whether comparative 
political theology may be the ultimate political theory. 
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Preliminary remark on "terrorism" 
 
I am aware that the term "terrorism" in many parts of the world has connotations that are – 
for historical reasons – somewhat different from the "West". Being European, I am 
however writing from a Western perspective and use the term "terrorism" in the meaning it 
has acquired in the politico-scientific discourse on violent Islamist attacks against (mainly) 
Western (or perceived Western-influenced) targets all over the world. Sometimes, today's 
terrorist movements are tomorrow's lauded liberators from political oppression (as, for 
example, in South Africa). That is the unknown course of history. Nevertheless, I think that 
the term "terrorists" appropriately describes the outside view on a movement of resistance 
against a given socio-political situation that employs violent means (particularly mass 
murder) against its (perceived) enemies (or sometimes its own people) in order to achieve 
its political goals. Of course, "terrorists" are always the others. 
 
1.2  Purpose of the study 
 
Although Islamist terrorists use information technology very actively, terrorist statements in 
Arabic are routinely removed from the Internet (by governmental authorities and/or private, 
largely Jewish, initiatives) as soon as they appear (for instance as postings in Islamist fora 
and newsgroups). Links to websites hardly ever work: "This site has been removed from 
the server". Only a small part of terrorist statements has been translated into English, and 
very few (available) Islamist websites are being published (partly) in English. Because of 
the restricted access to original sources, documents and messages, it is difficult for people 
in the West and in the Arab world alike to know what the terrorists really want and fight for 
(or against). 
 If we wish to understand the motivation driving adherents of radical Islam and, 
indeed, terrorists it is of utmost importance for us to explore and analyse at least the 
available translated terrorist statements. All too often the "War Against Terrorism" (or "The 
Long War" – a war, some say, for hearts and minds) is fought on the basis of propaganda 
that does not sufficiently engage the politico-theological arguments of the terrorists. Only 
once we take seriously the terrorists' own statements will we be able to understand that, in 
the terrorists' view, there is an "inherent incompatibility between the belief of the people, 
Islam, and the system being forced down their throats" in the process of globalization by 
the United States and the West, "Democracy/Capitalism" (British website Al Muhajiroun, 
2004f: par. 7). The prophet Muhammad 
struggled to uproot all man made laws and systems in order to replace them with Islam, 
while Democracy/Capitalism zealously pursues the establishment of man made laws 
(par. 8). 
Speaking of fundamentalist Muslims we should never forget that the very word Islam 
means "to submit" to the rule of Allah (Castells, 2002: 14). "The Muslim MUST reject 
anything that is obeyed, worshipped, followed or submitted to other than Allah" including 
the devil, "all the present rulers in the world, the United Nations, British Law, Freedom, 
Democracy, Secularism, Liberalism" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004h: par. 11). 
 Thus, Islam is inherently political. In Islam theology is politics. Theology cannot be 
separated from or replaced by politics, it seems. 
 In this paper I will suggest that representatives of terrorist movements such as al-
Qaeda see an intrinsic linkage between democracy and capitalism and that they operate 
from the premises that whoever wants to fight capitalism, and maybe sees globalization as 
today's primary manifestation of it, needs to abandon democracy and its values first. 
Whoever wants to fight capitalism, it appears, needs to fight democracy as well (see 
Kofmel, 2004, on various other traditions of a linkage between democracy and capitalism, 
for example classic liberalism, modernization theory, and empirical evidence). 
 In contrast to this, Christian "political theology" often aims at establishing democratic 
and humane conditions where no such exist. Many of its proponents assume (as does, for 
example, the anti-/alter-globalization movement: Kofmel, 2004) that a non-capitalist 
democracy is possible. This very notion, in spite of political theologians' arguing for a 
political role of religion, is based on Western secularism and the separation of politics and 
religion that is possible in Christianity but is arguably not possible in Islam. While most 
political and liberation theologians advocate non-violence, some (for example in the 
Philippines and Nicaragua) justified violent means in the struggle for (political) liberation. 
 At the same time, the terrorists quite often refer to or appear to be influenced by older 
(non-violent) traditions of radical Islam. I will therefore not exclusively focus on the violent 
component of radical Islam, but also take into account earlier and non-violent expressions 
of this line of thought. 
 It will be interesting to see to what extent the socio-political analysis of 
globalization/colonialism, underdevelopment, poverty, etc. of the various kinds of Christian 
"political theology" meets the socio-political analysis of Islamist terrorist movements and 
radical Islam and where they differ.  
 As a hypothesis I will assume that there are clear similarities in some key themes of 
the socio-political analysis of Christian political and liberation theologians and 
representatives of Islamist terrorist movements and radical Islam, respectively (particularly 
regarding "democracy", "capitalism", "globalization", "colonialism", and 
"underdevelopment"). 
 
1.3  Methodology and outline of the paper 
 
The hypothesis I postulate is to be tested primarily by method of "literature" review and 
comparative analysis. There are a number of Internet-based archives such as the Middle 
East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and Why War? that collect English translations 
(mostly from Arabic) of statements by leading representatives of terrorist organizations. I 
will explore and analyse these texts. Other parts of the research paper will be based on a 
very extensive exploratory literature review on Islam, "terrorism" and various traditions of 
"political theology". 
 In the immediately following second chapter I will define the term "political theology" 
and offer a short history and extended discussion of the concept and socio-political 
analysis advanced by political and liberation theologians. 
  In the third chapter I will analyse statements by representatives of Islamist terrorist 
movements posted on the Internet. Both in the second and third chapter I will focus on key 
themes such as democracy, capitalism, globalization, colonialism, and underdevelopment. 
I will argue that the terrorists view democracy and capitalism as inextricably linked and 
elaborate on radical Islam's understanding of theology and politics. 
  In the fourth chapter I will review secondary (and some primary) literature on 
Christian and Islamic political and liberation theologies and how they interlink and 
compare. I will situate Islamist terrorism within Islam by reviewing a number of recent 
publications by Western authors and some Islamic scholars concerning Islam, terrorism 
and (non-)violence. Can it be argued that the political analysis in mainstream Islam is the 
same as in the terrorist movements and that the difference lies in the theology/politics of 
(non-)violence? Furthermore, I will review authors (particularly theologians) who have 
written on terrorism and radical Islam from an explicitly Christian perspective and will see if 
someone has written on it in the context of "political theology". Finally, I will explore the 
most recent writings on "political theology" emanating from (mainly leftist) theory circles in 
Europe and the US. 
  In the last chapter I will compare radical Islam and Christian "political theology", 
asking whether (as I assume as a hypothesis) there are clear similarities in key themes of 
the socio-political analysis of and the arguments advanced by Christian political and 
liberation theologians and representatives of Islamist terrorist movements and radical 
Islam, respectively. If my study proves this hypothesis to be well-founded, I will argue that 
there is a kind of "political theology" underlying Islamist terrorism and radical Islam that can 
be set in relation to the Christian concepts of political theology and theology of liberation, 
and I will attempt to expand the term "political theology" to cover the socio-political 
analysis, arguments and ideology of radical Islam. 
 The validity and reliability of my research findings may be affected by a number of 
limitations that I cannot easily evade. 
  While English translations of terrorists' statements are conveniently to be found on 
the Internet, translators are not usually named and it is not possible to check the reliability 
of the translations – most of them hail from websites that are opposed to terrorism. I do not 
have the possibility to compare the English translation to the original Arabic terms and their 
meanings. 
 It is also not possible to verify if the statements made by the terrorists (or Christian 
political and liberation theologians, for that matter, for example with regard to non-violence) 
correspond to their real intentions. 
 Given the restrictions of a research paper, I will not be able to elaborate on many 
interesting side tracks, such as the Christian tradition of a "just war", dating back to the 
Middle Ages, or the intricacies of political theology arising in violent environments in the 
Philippines, Nicaragua and South Africa. When analysing political theology I will have to 
restrict myself to the ideology and beliefs expressed and the reasons given, with little 
possibility to research the historical context in which these ideologies and beliefs arose. 
 I will only be able to cover the most relevant authors in any one of the fields of 
literature reviewed. My analysis both of the statements of Islamist terrorist movements and 
Christian political theology will have to be restricted to socio-political key themes (such as 
how they view the nature of the linkage between democracy and capitalism, globalization, 
colonialism, underdevelopment) in order to be manageable. 
 Due to a lack of available data, I will abstain from comparing the organizational 
structures of radical Islam (terrorist movements) and Christian "political theology" (for 
example movements of liberation) and focus on the analysis and comparison of the 
underlying ideologies and beliefs. 
 The interpretation and analysis of data and information is, of course, qualitative and 
subjective. 
 While it could be deemed unethical to provide a platform for the thought of terrorist 
groups, I am of opinion that it must be possible to explore and analyse the terrorists' 
arguments in an academic setting. 
 
 
CHAPTER  2:  THE  CONCEPT  OF  "POLITICAL  THEOLOGY" 
 
2.1  Carl Schmitt 
 
The term "political theology" is generally said to have been coined in 1922 by a German 
professor of law, Carl Schmitt, in an essay of the same title, Politische Theologie: Vier 
Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität – Political theology: four chapters on the concept of 
sovereignty (1985/22 and 1979/22). According to a remark in a little regarded later article 
by Schmitt (1965: 65), it appears however that, earlier in the same year, the first three 
chapters of that now famous essay had been published under the title Soziologie des 
Souveränitätsbegriffs und politische Theologie (Sociology of the concept of sovereignty 
and political theology; my translation) in the collection Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. 
Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber (Main problems of sociology: Souvenir for Max Weber; 
my translation), edited by Melchior Pâlyi (Böckenförde, 1983: 19, takes this as evidence 
for the significance of Politische Theologie for a sociology of concepts and in particular 
legal and constitutional concepts). Chapter four of the essay, according to the same 
notice, had first been published in Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, an 
academic journal, also earlier in the year 1922. While Schmitt himself argued convincingly 
against Alois Dempf who, in a 1969 article, credited Erik Peterson with originating the term 
"political theology" (Schmitt, 1970: 21) – which may in fact have triggered the publication of 
a follow-up, Politische Theologie II, in 1970, in which Schmitt sought to refute Peterson's 
contributions to the study of political theology (Schmitt, 1970) –, Heinrich Meier traces the 
term just as convincingly back to Bakunin's derogatory 1871 attack, La Théologie politique 
de Mazzini et l'Internationale (Meier, 2006: 22). It remains unclear whether Schmitt knew 
Bakunin's text.  
 Schmitt's main thesis has it that the political organization of a society always reflects 
the religious or theological beliefs (or non-beliefs) of that society and time: "The 
metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as 
what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political 
organization" (1985/22: 46; Ball points out that already Descartes and Leibniz knew of the 
existence of such analogies: 1983/24: 112). This idea is based on the notion of "the two 
kingdoms and spheres of the teaching of St Augustine", the two "societates perfectae", 
"Civitas Dei and Civitas Terrena – religion and politics, kingdom come and earthly kingdom 
[Jenseits und Diesseits]", "Church and state" – and transcends it in the secular twentieth 
century (Schmitt, 1970: 18-19; my translation; Schmitt's italics; St Augustine and Varro are 
frequently identified as critics of an early form of practized "political theology", namely 
Roman "civil religion": see, for example, Meier, 2006: 21-22; also Koslowski, 1983: 31, on 
the subjugation of "the truth of religion to its political usefulness" in ancient "political 
theology"; my translation; Blumenberg, 1983: 101, refers to Aristotle's promotion of "the 
idea of religion being 'tantum politicam inventionem' [only a political invention]"; 
Blumenberg's brackets; my italics). 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver (Schmitt, 1985/22: 36). 
Schmitt, whose essay is primarily concerned with the concept of sovereignty, holds that 
"[t]he 'omnipotence' of the modern lawgiver, of which one reads in every textbook on public 
law, is not only linguistically derived from theology" (38). The "miracle in theology" is for 
Schmitt analogous to the "exception" in a state's legal order – that is, a state of emergency 
(36). 
Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the 
philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries. The idea of the modern 
constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that 
banished the miracle from the world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not only 
the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct 
intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the sovereign's direct 
intervention in a valid legal order. The rationalism of the Enlightenment rejected the 
exception in every form (36-37). 
Schmitt's concept of political theology applies equally, for instance, to the seventeenth 
century in which "the monarch is identified with God and has in the state a position exactly 
analogous to that attributed to God in the Cartesian system of the world" (46), "the 'neutral' 
power of the nineteenth century, 'which reigned but did not rule,'" and later "conceptions of 
the pure measure and administrative state, 'which administers but does not rule'" (1-2). 
While the "liberal constitutionalism" of France's July Monarchy "attempted to paralyze the 
king through parliament but permitted him to remain on the throne – an inconsistency 
committed by deism when it excluded God from the world but held onto his existence" (59) 
–, the liberalism of Schmitt's days "discusses and negotiates every political detail, so it 
also wants to dissolve metaphysical truth in a discussion" (63). "Although the liberal 
bourgeoisie wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he 
had to be powerless" (59). 
Tocqueville in his account of American democracy observed that in democratic thought 
the people hover above the entire political life of the state, just as God does above the 
world, as the cause and the end of all things, as the point from which everything 
emanates and to which everything returns (49). 
Democracy and that the "the people became the sovereign" (48) is "as self-evident in the 
consciousness of that period as" monarchy was in an earlier time (46). Even "the 
economic postulates of free trade and commerce are, for an examination within the realm 
of the history of ideas, only derivatives of a metaphysical core" (62). 
 In the "battle against God" (50), 
the radicals who opposed all existing order directed, with heightened awareness, their 
ideological efforts against the belief in god altogether, fighting that belief as if it were 
the most fundamental expression of the belief in any authority and unity (50). 
They proclaimed "that mankind had to be substituted for God" (51). 
 It is important to note that since the twentieth century, in Schmitt's opinion, there can 
be no theology anymore that is not political: 
We have come to recognize that the political is the total, and as a result we know that 
any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision, 
irrespective of who decides and what reasons are advanced. This also holds for the 
question whether a particular theology is a political or an unpolitical theology (2; his 
italics). 
In his subsequent essay, Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder 
Politischen Theologie (Political Theology II: The legend of all political theology having been 
finished off; my rough translation; 1970), Schmitt explains that "the historically inherited 
institutions of Church and state had successfully been challenged by a revolutionary class 
..., the industrial proletariat", a "new subject of the political", and to it "the state lost the 
monopoly of the political" (1970: 24; my translation; his italics). "The two 'kingdoms'" of St 
Augustine are not clearly distinguishable anymore (Schmitt, 1970: 23; my translation). It is 
true that there has always been the Thomas-Hobbes-question 
Quis judicabit? Quis interpretabitur? Who decides in concreto ... what is religious and 
what is secular and what is the case with the res mixtae that make up, in the interim 
between the arrival and the return of the Lord, the entire earthly existence of this 
religious-secular, spiritual-temporal double being man? (107; my translation; Schmitt's 
italics) 
However: "Today the political can no longer be defined from the state, but that what still 
can be called state today has rather to be defined and understood from the political" (25; 
my translation). Besides the industrial proletariat there are now many other non-state 
political actors, one must add. 
 
2.2  The German debate, 1922-85 
 
In 1970, Schmitt also discussed how the concept of political theology had developed in the 
legal, political and theological thought of Germany and the German-speaking countries 
between 1922 and 1969. He recalls a vivid academic debate in these countries of which 
we may be largely unaware today. (For a discussion of Schmitt's reception in Spain since 
1929, including his Politische Theologie and Politische Theologie II, see Beneyto, 1983: 
20-61 and bibliography, 190-215.) In support of his argument Schmitt points to a number 
of publications (that are not easily – or not at all – available in English) such as (in 
chronological order) in 1924 an article on Politische Theologie by Hugo Ball, the former 
actor, dramaturge and co-founder of the centre for dadaism in Zurich (Scholz, 1983: 167), 
in the Catholic journal Hochland (which still published articles on the subject in the 1960s) 
(Ball, 1983/24); Carl Eschweiler's essay Politische Theologie in the journal Religiöse 
Besinnung in 1931/32; a book called Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem; ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum (Monotheism as 
a political problem: a contribution to the history of political theology in the Roman empire; 
my translation), published 1935 by the Catholic professor of theology, Erik Peterson; after 
a noticeable period of silence, caused probably by the clouds of the Hitler regime (as a 
comment on which Peterson's book was read at the time of its appearance: Schmitt, 1970: 
16) and the Second World War, Ernst Topitsch's 1955 essay Kosmos und Herrschaft, 
Ursprünge der politischen Theologie (Cosmos and power: origins of political theology; my 
translation) in the Catholic journal Wort und Wahrheit; the book Die Legitimität der Neuzeit 
of 1966 in which Hans Blumenberg attempted a scientific negation of any political theology 
(extended and revised edition 1974 under the title: Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung 
– Secularization and self-assertion; my translation; English translation: The legitimacy of 
the modern age: Blumenberg, 1983); Robert Hepp's dissertation on Politische Theologie 
und Theologische Politik: Studien zur Säkularisierung des Protestantismus im Weltkrieg 
und in der Weimarer Republik (Political theology and theological politics: studies on the 
secularization of protestantism during World War I and the Weimar republic; my 
translation), submitted 1967 at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg; Hans Barion's article Weltgeschichtliche Machtform? Eine Studie zur 
Politischen Theologie des II. Vatikanischen Konzils (roughly translated as: A political 
power in world history? A study on the political theology of the second Vatican council) 
(1968), published in a volume of articles honouring Carl Schmitt's 80th birthday (such 
presents to highly regarded scholars by friends, colleagues and former students are a 
much respected German tradition); the protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann's 1969 talk 
on Politische Theologie on the occasion of a further-training-day for German physicians; 
and, finally, one more article Politische Theologie, this one – directed particularly against 
the "new political theology" of J. B. Metz – published by Hans Maier, a leading German 
political scientist, in the February 1969 issue of Stimmen der Zeit. 
 Most of these authors seem to argue, in different ways and for different reasons, 
against the concept of a political theology, building up on Peterson's attempt to 
demonstrate, on the example of the Roman empire, the impossibility of any political 
theology (Schmitt, 1970). However, as Schmitt shows (1970: 52-60, 65-68, 94), even 
Peterson dismisses political theology only for monotheistic-trinitarian Christianity in 
absolute monarchies and concedes forms of political theology in other, non-Christian or 
pre-trinitarian Christian societies (an example is Peterson: 1983/33). According to Schmitt, 
political theology is an extremely "double-sided and bipolar field": "There are many political 
theologies, since there are on the one hand many different religions and on the other hand 
many different kinds and methods of politics" (1970: 51; my translation). Peterson's 
argument has since been refuted by Schmitt (1970) – not least because it was itself "a 
political answer to a political question" of the years around 1935 (Schmitt, 1970: 85; my 
translation), making use of a "highly theological alienation effect" (87; my translation) – as 
well as by the subsequent development of Christian political theologies, particularly in the 
guise of "liberation theology" in Latin America. 
In the meantime – since 1935 – the two complexes left out of consideration [by 
Peterson], democracy and revolution, have thoroughly avenged themselves. The 
intense debate, conducted by Catholic and protestant theologians alike, on a 'Christian 
revolution' does not feel affected in any way by Peterson's verdict (Schmitt, 1970: 63; 
my translation). 
George Schwab, Schmitt's translator (Schmitt, 1985), adds some authors to the list who 
wrote after 1969, and more favourably, for example 1983 José Maria Beneyto in his book 
Politische Theologie als politische Theorie (Political theology as political theory; my 
translation); and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Politische Theorie und politische Theologie: 
Bemerkungen zu ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis (Political theory and political theology: 
comments on their mutual relationship; my translation) (1983), in a book called Der Fürst 
dieser Welt: Carl Schmitt und die Folgen (Taubes, 1983) (roughly translated as: The prince 
of this world: Carl Schmitt and the consequences). The book was based on talks given on 
occasion of the meetings of a 1980 working group on "Religionstheorie und politische 
Theologie" (Theory of religion and political theology; my translation) (Taubes, 1983: 5) and 
was to be volume 1 of a series, commissioned by two German publishers, bearing the 
same name as the working group. The book refers back to the earlier publications by Ball 
and Peterson (publishing them in part) and contains many other articles on political 
theology such as (to give an indication of the breadth of the German debate) Politische 
Theologie als Theologie repolitisierter Religion (Political theology as theology of 
repoliticized religion; my translation) by Hermann Lübbe; Politischer Polytheismus – auch 
eine politische Theologie? (Political polytheism – also a political theology?; my translation) 
by Odo Marquard; Jenseits von politischer Theologie und unpolitischer Theologie: Zum 
Ansatz der "Dialektischen Theologie" (Beyond political theology and apolitical theology – 
on the approach of "dialectical theology"; my translation) by Dieter Schellong; as well as 
discussions of the "political theologies" of Hobbes, Hegel, Schmitt and Max Weber, among 
others. 
 The number of authors and the variety of contributions gathered in this book clearly 
demonstrate that even parallel to the rise of Metz' "new political theology" the lively debate 
on Schmitt's earlier concept of political theology did neither cease nor diminish and that 
Metz was merely taken as one expression of the general concept.  
 Further publications referred to in the book include the collections edited by Helmut 
Peukert, Diskussion zur "politischen Theologie" (Discussion on "political theology"; my 
translation) (1969), and by Ernst Feil and Rudolf Weth, Diskussion zur "Theologie der 
Revolution" (Discussion on the "theology of revolution"; my translation) (1969); the books 
by Hans Maier, Kritik der politischen Theologie (Criticism of political theology; my 
translation) (1970), and Klaus-Michael Kodalle, Politik als Macht und Mythos: Carl 
Schmitts "Politische Theologie" (Politics as power and myth: Carl Schmitt's "political 
theology"; my translation) (1973); as well as Robert Spaemann's chapter Theologie, 
Prophetie, Politik: Zur Kritik der politischen Theologie (Theology, prophecy, politics: on the 
criticism of political theology; my translation) (1977). 
 Beneyto (1983) lists two more collections, by Gustav E. Kafka and Ulrich Matz (Eds.), 
Zur Kritik der politischen Theologie (On the criticism of political theology; my translation) 
(1970 and/or 1973, both dates are given in different places of Beneyto's book), and by 
Manfred Baumotte, Hans-Walter Schütte, Falk Wagner and Horst Renz (Eds.), Kritik der 
politischen Theologie (1973), as well as two articles nowhere else noted – Heinrich 
Getzeny's Wieweit ist die politische Theologie des Reichs heute noch sinnvoll? (To what 
extent is the political theology of the Reich still useful [or meaningful] today?; my 
translation and italics), published in Hochland in 1933, and Martin Greiffenhagen's Zum 
Problem einer "Politischen Theologie" (On the problem of a "political theology"; my 
translation) in Zeitwende in 1961 – and a book-length publication in French: François Biot, 
Théologie du politique (1972). 
 
2.3  The "new political theology" of J. B. Metz and its relation to Schmitt 
 
While the authors and proponents of "liberation theology" in Latin America were not, to my 
knowledge, aware of the earlier German debate, or did not take note of it, another 
German, Johann Baptist Metz, appropriated the term "political theology" rather 
unceremoniously in the late 1960s (Zur Theologie der Welt was published in 1968) (Metz, 
1969b: 107-140). It appears that among theologians it is his more than Schmitt's use of the 
term that we mean when we speak of "political theology" today (although Metz' approach 
is often also referred to as the "new political theology"). 
 The wording of a paragraph in Schmitt (1970) referring to Metz lets one assume that, 
although Schmitt obviously had read Metz' book, the two had not met each other nor, 
indeed, had they had any contact by 1969: Maier's criticism, Schmitt writes, was directed 
against "what the Catholic theologian J. B. Metz presents openly as his political theology 
under this designation. ... Metz uses the term political theology expressly for this his 
cause" (Schmitt, 1970: 31; my translation; Schmitt's italics). Metz does not seem to have 
sought Schmitt's counsel on using the latter's terminology. Given the reputation Schmitt 
enjoyed in post-World War II Germany, and his high visibility (see Lilla, 1997: 39), this is 
not easily to be explained. An acknowledgement of his intellectual indebtedness to Schmitt 
is not readily to be found in Metz' writings (a fact others have noticed as well: see for 
example Lübbe, 1983: 48; Maier, 1970: 14). A very short reference is contained in a rather 
obscure early article (1969: 278) where Metz refers to Schmitt as the author of "classical 
political theology" (my translation; presumably as opposed to Metz' "new political 
theology") and accuses "classical political theology" of being ambiguous in its criticism of 
society. 
 Most likely we have to seek the reason for Metz' reluctance to acknowledge Schmitt 
in a change of political direction that Metz gave the term "political theology". We may have 
to understand it as a kind of Marxist appropriation of the means of (in this case: 
intellectual) production. (Equally, we could call it a symptom of the politics of theology – or 
academia in general.) Schmitt used the term "political theology" to designate the authors of 
the Catholic counter-revolution – Donoso Cortés, Bonald, and de Maistre, "authors ... who 
were theists" and attempted "to support the personal sovereignty of the monarch 
ideologically, with the aid of analogies from a theistic theology" (1985/22: 37). They were 
anti-liberal and anti-democratic, Schmitt argues, in that they 
considered continuous discussion a method of circumventing responsibility and of 
ascribing to freedom of speech and of the press an excessive importance that in the 
final analysis permits the decision to be evaded. ... The essence of liberalism is 
negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the 
decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the 
decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion (63). 
They opposed all "contradictions and compromises". Liberalism existed for them "only in 
that short interim period in which it was possible to answer the question 'Christ or 
Barabbas?' with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a commission of investigation" (62). 
The kind of economic-technical thinking that prevails today is no longer capable of 
perceiving a political idea. ... Political ideas are generally recognized only when groups 
can be identified that have a plausible economic interest in turning them to their 
advantage. Whereas, on the one hand, the political vanishes into the economic or 
technical-organizational, on the other hand the political dissolves into the everlasting 
discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical commonplaces ... The core of the 
political idea, the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both. The true significance of 
those counter-revolutionary philosophers of the state lies precisely in the consistency 
with which they decide. They heightened the moment of the decision to such an extent 
that the notion of legitimacy, their starting point, was finally dissolved (65). 
Schmitt calls this "decisionism". Its "logical conclusion" for Donoso Cortés, once he had 
found "that the period of monarchy had come to an end because there no longer were 
kings and no one would have the courage to be king in any way other than by the will of 
the people", was for him to advocate "a political dictatorship" (66). "It is the solution that 
Hobbes also reached by the same kind of decisionist thinking, though mixed with 
mathematical relativism. Autoritas, non veritas facit legem" (52; his italics). 
 Metz, on the other hand, went on to write a book, Faith in History and Society (1980), 
that appears to have been heavily influenced by Marxism (Metz does not deny this – see, 
for example, his remarks in 1980: 53; one would be hard pressed to say if the name of 
Jesus or Marx is evoked more often throughout the book). 
 In 1968, writing still comparatively temperate, Metz himself defined "political 
theology" thus (in a way not incompatible with Schmitt): 
I understand political theology, first of all, to be a critical correction of present-day 
theology inasmuch as this theology shows an extreme privatizing tendency (a 
tendency, that is, to center upon the private person rather than 'public,' 'political' 
society) (1969b: 107).  
And he insists: "The deprivatizing of theology is the primary critical task of political 
theology" (110; his italics). Our very existence is for Metz political and  
any existential and personal theology that does not understand existence as a political 
problem in the widest sense of the word, must inevitably restrict its considerations to an 
abstraction. ... With this, the positive task of political theology comes to light. It is, to 
determine anew the relation between religion and society, between Church and 
societal 'publicness,' between eschatological faith and societal life (111; his italics). 
"Every eschatological theology, therefore, must become a political theology, that is, a 
(socio-)critical theology" (115; his italics). He holds that "our intention is not, once again, to 
mix faith and 'politics' in a reactionary manner" (112-113) – and, saying this, he may well 
have thought of Schmitt (he later refers to Donoso Cortés, Bonald and de Maistre, among 
other "traditionalist" authors: 1980: 20). Rhetorically he asks: 
When was the [Catholic] Church truly an institution of critical liberty? When was she in 
fact critically revolutionary? When was she not simply counterrevolutionary resentful, 
and nagging in her relation to the societal world? (1969b: 117) 
In this context we ought to expose that it was Bonald who said "reality is in society and in 
history [in der Gesellschaft und in der Geschichte]" (in Schmitt, 1970: 36; my translation 
and italics) – knowing the title of Metz' most famous book one might suspect here another 
case of unaccounted-for appropriation. 
 Before entering into a discussion of the left-leaning writings of the "new political 
theology", "liberation theology", and related theologies, let us just remember once more 
that Carl Schmitt's original concept of "political theology" is much broader than to cover 
only the revolutionary movements of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Something we may, 
outside the German-speaking countries, not sufficiently have taken note of. As Metz said 
himself: we must though "prevent the Church from being uncritically identified with specific 
political ideologies and thus having it sink to the level of a purely political religion" – by 
which, of course, he meant right-wing ideologies (1980: 89), but we may as well 
understand the one-sided identification with his brand of political theology. (Whenever 
Metz speaks of the "Church" in his writings it is the Roman-Catholic Church he refers to, 
and his political theology is in the first instance meant to rouse this denomination.) Rightly, 
Schmitt noted that "in the changing friend-enemy-formations of world history theology can 
politically just as well become an object of the revolution as of the counter-revolution" 
(1970: 22; my translation). 
 In Faith in History and Society (in German-speaking theological circles fondly called 
"GGG", shorthand for Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft), Metz, a student of Karl 
Rahner and professor of fundamental theology at the University of Münster, set out to 
draw up what he called a "practical fundamental theology", or a theology "that operates 
subject to the primacy of praxis" (1980: 50) – the latter consisting of "communication and 
action" (51) –, that does not subordinate "praxis to theory or the idea" (50). Today, this 
book is generally acknowledged as a standard work of modern theology. 
 Nevertheless we should not spare it the criticism that, in my opinion, the book and its 
author richly deserve. First and foremost, there are its many contradictions. For example, 
Metz demands a "biographical dogmatic theology", that is, an articulation of the subjective 
mystical biography of a theologian in his theology rather than a vain attempt at scientific 
objectivity (220) – while on the other hand slamming the "middle-class, privatistic 
subjectivity which led to the crisis in Christianity and the Church and which therefore not so 
easily can be given theological honours" (36). He demands a restoration of the "radically 
Christian concept of praxis" (28) and insists that theology "must again and again be 
interrupted by praxis and experience" and transcend "the narrow sphere of professional 
theology" (59), while we cannot but notice that his is a thoroughly theoretical approach that 
does neither enlighten us as to its author's "mystical biography of religious experience" 
(220) nor refer to any concrete situations and realities of suffering save in the most general 
and abstract terms. Suffice it to say that no reader will be moved, by this book, to any 
practical action. 
 I somewhat mistrust the English translation as I do not re-cognize terms that are 
quite central to Metz' argument. Can one really translate "Bürger" as "middle-class subject" 
(29; my italics)? In German the word's meaning is surely closer to "bourgeois" (the 
educated and cultivated lower upper class of times past rather than the middle class of our 
times; Shanks, 1991: 216, footnote no. 2, seems to confirm this observation). I also think I 
have not come across derivatives such as the "bürgerlich-egoistische" (bourgeois-
egotistic; my translation and italics) subject. What happened to the catchy slogan "Glaube 
als Praxis" (faith as praxis; my translation and italics)? And "verlorene Zeit" (Metz, 1992: 
165; my italics) is not "forgotten time" (Metz, 1980: 169) – rather "lost time" (as in Proust). 
 Favourably we can notice that the English version reads somewhat easier than the 
heavy-handed German text. The translator spares us the worst of Metz' offences against 
(the German) language – such as his "Pointe des Christentums" (1992: 120 – the 
punchline of Christianity; my translation and italics), "Geschichte mit reiner Weste" (127 – 
history with a clean waistcoat, figurative for: a clean record; my translation and italics; 
actually, in German, one speaks of a clean conscience but a white waistcoat) or a 
"pausbäckig-kleinbürgerliche" idea of progress (195 – chubby-bourgeois; my translation 
and italics, but in all its absurdity and demeaning undertones not really translatable). Many 
terms Metz coined that are not even to be found in German dictionaries or dictionaries of 
foreign words in use in the German language as well as terms he misused (for example 
"imperatorisch" instead of "imperativ") have not found their way into the English translation 
either. All these mistakes, in German, are noticeably to the disadvantage of Metz himself 
and the power of persuasion of his argument. Under the crushing weight of the linguistic 
ballast much remains vague. 
 The most devastating critique, however, is being levelled by Fierro: 
Unfortunately repetition rather than in-depth treatment is the characteristic feature of 
most political theologies. The work of Metz, for example, is very repetitive. What he 
says in two or three works seems to be repeated ad infinitum in all his other writings. 
Some articles seem so similar to each other that the reader can only wonder whether 
one and the same text has been slightly corrected by the author, whether he is dealing 
with different versions of the same text, or simply whether the author is being exploited 
by his publishers (1977: 130). 
 
2.4  The socio-political analysis of Christian "political theology" 
 
2.4.1  Metz 
 
Our interest lies with the common ideology and socio-political analysis arguably underlying 
Christian political theologies – including European "political theology", "new political 
theology" and "theology of hope", Latin American "liberation theology" and "theology of 
revolution", Philippine "theology of struggle", Korean "minjung theology" and African "black 
theology". An analysis of the writings of major representatives of these theological 
movements may lead to the emergence of common aspects and characteristics of 
Christian "political theology". 
 Already in 1922, Schmitt advanced a seemingly very contemporary analysis of 
Western society: 
Today nothing is more modern than the onslaught against the political. American 
financiers, industrial technicians, Marxist socialists, and anarchic-syndicalist 
revolutionaries unite in demanding that the biased rule of politics over unbiased 
economic management be done away with. There must no longer be political 
problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks. ... The 
modern state seems to have actually become what Max Weber envisioned: a huge 
industrial plant (1985/22: 65). 
Metz chose as the starting point of his political theology a criticism of the ideological 
upholder of Western "affluent society" (1980: 103). He propagates the rise of a "subject 
who is not yet established" (28), fundamentally different from the Western middle-class 
citizen whose "practical understanding is orientated almost exclusively ... on the 
satisfaction of his own needs" (29) and "control of nature in the interest of the market" (43), 
who follows "the laws of profit and success" (37) – centring around "[p]roduction, trade and 
consumption" and "the principle of exchange" –, who is "private" and "individual" and "no 
longer sustained by any all-embracing traditions, let alone religious traditions" (35). 
From the political point of view, this results in his claim to self-determination and self-
government on the one hand and a precarious separation between private and public 
interests on the other. Religion has become a private matter. It is possible to make use 
of it to satisfy cultural needs, but it is no longer necessary to have it in order to be a 
subject (35). 
Ball shows that again already Schmitt deplored that "the religion of modern European 
society" had become "a religion of private matter [Privatsache] and private property" (Ball, 
1983/24: 113; my translation and italics; Spaemann holds that "the precedence of saving 
one's own soul over against changing any worldly conditions" is inherent in the New 
Testament: 1977: 67; my translation; de Quervain, 1931, stresses that although the 
individual human being stands in the centre of faith – rather than a people or community –, 
humans are united in being part of creation). This despised "middle-class subject" (Metz, 
1980: 29), true to Metz' nature, is a theoretical construct, it seems, rather than a human 
presence deserving of Christian consideration: 
Theology, which believes that it is bound to defend the contemporary human subject 
uncritically as a religious subject, is, in this perspective, simply a late reflection of this 
middle-class religion ('bürgerliche Religion') (33; his or translator's italics).  
The world we Westerners inhabit is defined by Metz as a "technological and scientific 
culture which produces apathy and in which the death of the subject, the destruction of 
language and the end of history are anticipated, at least in theory" (74; interestingly, Metz 
predates with this remark Fukuyama's The end of history thesis by fifteen or twenty years, 
see Fukuyama, 1989 and 1992). In this time of "genetic manipulation and a computer 
ideology" (Metz, 1980: 103), an "all-encroaching and anonymous production process" 
(101) "prefabricates man's pattern of life and produces a weariness with human identity 
that eats at man's soul" (221). The "form of freedom" of these societies "with the liberal 
pluralism" "is increasingly formal and without content" (104). "The eschaton of that society 
is boredom" (92; again a remark strangely reminiscent of Fukuyama's later writings, see 
for example Fukuyama, 1989: 18). 
We are becoming ever more conscious of the dangers and antagonisms that arise 
when technological and economic processes are left to their own nature. Laws and our 
political and social control systems break down: dying cities, ruined environments, 
population explosions, chaotic information channels, an increasingly aggressive and 
vicious intensification of the North-South conflict, ... and so on (Metz, 1980: 100). 
Early in his seminal work Metz refers to what has since become known as the 
phenomenon of "globalization": 
Socio-political and economic relationships are becoming increasingly interdependent 
and for this reason no situation can be determined in the concrete without considering 
this global aspect. Any attempt to obtain a practical result without taking the global 
aspect into consideration will only be dubiously abstract (4). 
Already in the 1970s,  
[g]lobal interventions have become the concrete theme of political action. This is why 
politics can no longer be conducted simply within the framework of national action and 
exclusively with the interest of national security, which are often ideologically 
motivated, in mind (103). 
This also involves the "globalisation" of theology away from its situation in "middle-class, 
Central-European society" (4) and acceptance of the "world-wide scale in political 
theology" (12) and its "global significance" (103): 
The conflict between North and South that is so extensively discussed nowadays 
cannot be defined or resolved in regional terms, nor can it be neutralized by the Church 
and theologians as a purely political and economic event. It is above all a conflict with 
significant effects on the one Church throughout the world (4). 
Metz stresses that there are "various points of contact and opportunities for a critical 
exchange of ideas between the political theology and the theology of liberation" (11): 
This applies not only to their mutual insistence on an analysis of the situation on a 
world-wide scale, but also to many important elements of the theology ... These include 
a concentration on the primacy of praxis, the basic category of solidarity and a theology 
of the subject based on the idea of the whole of mankind in solidarity and subjection to 
God (11). 
This solidarity means "to suffer the sufferings of others" (95). It includes the sharing of 
"sorrow and melancholy" and present "suffering" (57) with "the living and future 
generations" (76) and "openness to past suffering, in other words, as solidarity with the 
dead and those who have been overcome" (57) – remembering the "sacrifices of history" 
(58) and that "the happiness of the descendants cannot compensate for the suffering of 
the ancestors" (75) – as well as an "attitude of resistance to the interiorization and 
privatization of these pathic forms of expression of social praxis" (57). 
Can the rich churches of the North only redress the balance between them and the 
poor churches of the South that has been destroyed by what has been recognized as 
the mechanics of exploitation and structural injustice by means of almsgiving? (70-71) 
In Metz' opinion, "the struggle for God and the struggle to enable all men to be free 
subjects does not operate in the opposite direction, but proportionally in the same 
direction" (62). "Any theology that aims to justify Christian faith and its tradition critically" 
has to address questions of "public life, justice and freedom" (88). Though "there is 
certainly religion in an authentic form even when there is oppression" (71), political 
theology aims at "speaking about God by making the connection between the Christian 
message and the modern world visible" (89): 
[T]he Church must understand and justify itself as the public witness and bearer of the 
tradition of a dangerous memory of freedom in the 'systems' of our emancipative 
society. ... In faith, Christians accomplish the memoria passionis, mortis et 
resurrectionis Jesu Christi. ... This memoria Jesu Christi ... anticipates the future as a 
future of those who are oppressed, without hope and doomed to fail. ... Christian faith 
can and must, in my opinion, be seen in this way as a subversive memory (90-91; his 
or translator's italics). 
 
2.4.2  Political theologies in Europe and North America 
 
At the borderline of "political theology and theological politics" (Schmitt, 1965: 53; my 
translation), political theology is seen as controversial because interests often take 
precedence over against academic rigour, claims Taubes (1983: 5; my translation). 
Richard Faber agrees with Blumenberg that "the term 'political theology' generally 
conceals that what is meant is 'theology as politics'" (Faber, 1983: 86; my translation; see 
Blumenberg, 1983: 97-98). Böckenförde warns of "[t]he danger of the transition from 
argumentatively justified theology to merely engaged theological politics (often inspired by 
Marxism)" (1983: 21; my translation) and Marquard sees the "new – eschatological – 
'political theology'" as burdened with an "immense blindness for the reality of the political 
(through infantilization) and ... reduction of love of neighbour [Nächstenliebe] in favour of 
love of the furthest [Fernstenliebe]" (1983: 78; my translation and italics). Barion argues 
that the eschatological nature of the Catholic Church means that she has "no political 
ideal, only political goals" (1965: 162; my translation). Spaemann gives the example of 
how the goals of the Church in post-World War II Germany – anticommunism, social 
market economy, confessional schools and state funding for ecclesiastical welfare 
institutions, among others – led to her supporting the Christian-Democratic Party (1977: 
58). In this light, "the political decisions of the Church must by definition take the form of an 
interim" (Barion, 1965: 162; my translation). It could be argued that both Schmitt's 
"classical" and Metz' "new" political theology may then be compatible with faith if seen in 
their historic context (although Spaemann claims that the new political theology sought to 
break with the sort of political Christianity, and particularly political Catholicism, of 1950s 
Germany: 1977: 58-59). Maier lists a number of cases in which the Church did side with 
liberal and revolutionary movements, such as in the Belgians' fight for independence in 
1830, or "healing" (Heilung) the Bolivarian Revolution in Latin America in 1827 by 
appointing new bishops for Greater Columbia (1970: 75). Maier understands political 
theology "as a means of a contemporary hermeneutics" that analyses society in the critical 
light of the Gospel and attempts "to formulate the eschatological message under the 
conditions of today's society" (12; my translation). He sees the "new political theology" as 
a "secularised 'dialectic' variant of the old one" (103; my translation) – "instead of order, 
change, 'God's action in history', is being theologised" (62; my translation). He criticizes 
that the most progressive currents of theology, such as the new political theology and 
theology of revolution, had already forgotten the important message of the Second Vatican 
Council, a few years earlier, that unity in faith can go together with plurality in political 
belief and that, in particular, the faithful as citizens, acting in private capacity or as 
associations, and the Church as an institution may differ in political convictions (13; see 
also Barion, 1968, particularly 16). The quest for democratization of the Catholic Church 
Maier calls "naïve" in its assumption of a rule of homogeneity according to which "the 
Church can and must not be constituted in any other way than the state" (100; my 
translation). Metz, in his eyes, uncritically adopts Marxist patterns of interpretation (34). 
Rohrmoser speaks of a "theologisation of Marxism and a sociologisation of theology" 
(1968: 618; my translation). 
 The importance of political theology for political theory is highlighted by Böckenförde 
who says that "if God exists, if a divine revelation has happened, if theological statements 
contain truth" this must have an impact on politics (1983: 17; my translation). Barion, with 
Schmitt, derives the role of the Church as a challenger for political authority from the fact 
that she represents "'civitas humana' and 'Christ himself, personally, the God who has 
become man in historical reality'". The Church thus constitutes itself as inherently political 
(1968: 14; my translation). Metz' vision of the Church is "a Church in which the people 
have emerged from their natural collective patterns of identity as a nation, race and class", 
have become "a new people and have found a new identity in the presence of God" (Metz, 
1980: 151). Kodalla, referring to later writings of Schmitt's, thinks though that "with 
progressing de-theologisation the historic religiosity of Europe, the Christian faith, has lost 
its political power" (1973: 53; my translation; his italics). Schmitt himself says, in 1970, that 
"the de-theologisation contains a de-politicisation in the sense that the world stops being 
'politomorph'" (1970: 119; my translation). In a world without theology, there will be no 
political participation either, it seems. Koslowski holds that non-dogmatic theological 
reflection (such as "political theology as analogy") might help to make political theory more 
reasonable (1983: 34; my translation; his italics). 
 Maier points out that there are no clear definitions distinguishing "political theology" 
and "theology of revolution" and that both very much merge into one another, with some 
authors using the terms interchangeably (1970: 62-65; Metz claims though to have 
critically distanced himself and the new political theology from certain forms of "theology of 
revolution": 1969a: 280). The main proponent of theology of revolution, Moltmann, to 
confuse things even further, called his book The gospel of liberation (1973) and generally 
seems to be speaking of global, rather than Western, phenomena. He aims at "liberating 
the internally and externally oppressed man for faith, love, and hope ... in the name of the 
crucified and resurrected Christ, and in the name of his smallest brother in our world" 
(1973: 11) because "[t]here is no redemption of the soul without a liberation of the body" 
(22). "Man is subjected bodily to death, sicknesses, hunger, exploitation, and degradation 
by other men" (88). 
[W]e often hear the cry of the hungry in Biafra and South America and other war-torn 
and disaster-stricken countries. However, there are more unheard cries and requests in 
the world than there are ears to hear them or hands to fulfil them (20). 
Without wanting us to be "accusers of other men, of the bad, godless society" (40), 
Moltmann, who conveys the impression of being more religiously inspired than Metz, 
passionately prays (in writing): "Out of the depths the dead in Viet Nam cry to you, and 
also those who have killed them. ... Out of the depths cry to you the hungry in Africa, Asia, 
and South America; and also the satiated in Europe who let them hunger" (24; his italics).  
 In the West, 
[f]reedom and living space are there for the clever and for those who have arrived. But 
where is freedom for the children on our streets, for the aged, the handicapped and the 
injured? The old in our rest homes, the sick in our hospitals, the prisoners in our jails, 
the handicapped in our institutions (61)? 
There is "apartheid politics, persecution of Communists, Democratic hunts, persecution of 
Christians, anti-Semitism, racial hate, and so on" (67; his italics). There is "idolization of 
the living standard, of nation, of race, of progress, etc." (101). People are "brought to 
sacrifice to the fetishism of goods and consumption" (83) that "impoverish man in the 
search for pleasure and fulfilment and let him return empty". Moltmann asks us to destroy 
the "many idols in our lives" (26) because "the destruction of hate and power begins with 
the liberation from fetishes, idols, and person cults which promise security and lead into 
death " (102). According to him, they are "idols without future" (26; on "idolatry" and 
fetishism see Hinkelammert, 1983 and 1986). 
  Because "religion is misused for the purpose of keeping the poor quiet so that the 
sufferers will be satisfied with unrighteousness and not protest it strongly" (Moltmann, 
1973: 80), we should "break out of our churches and out of the anxious egoism of our 
nations and develop a new piety of solidarity with all the damned of this earth", Moltmann 
says (88). "Theology of revolution is ... not a theology for bishops, but a lay theology of the 
suffering and fighting Christians of this world" and part of it is "a revolution of theology" 
(1969: 68; my translation). Like Metz, Moltmann urges us to "understand again the 
'revolutionary' character of the Bible. ... We must obtain again the sharpness of the gospel 
if we want to spread the freedom of the Crucified out into this chaotic world" (1973: 90). 
"Christianity is not only a religion of salvation, but at the same time an encompassing 
revolution of earthly affairs" (126). 
 The "God of Hope" of Romans 15:13 "steps over the boundary of race, in which man 
loathes man, and the boundaries of class and strata in society. He despises the difference 
between black and white, poor and rich, educated and uneducated" (26-27). "Jesus 
himself proclaimed the kingdom to the poor, but not only to the poor. He proclaimed it to 
the rich also" (41). He "became an intense partisan of the weak, the discriminated against, 
and the hopeless" (89). Too often, however, the faithful do not follow him (28), refusing to 
be "agents of reconciliation in this society" (39-40). Moltmann fears that suffering, 
migration and (Western) multiculturalism will lead to dire consequences if not tempered by 
"hope": "The more we grow together today into one world, the more men of different types 
mix together, the more dangerous will this be considered by society" (67). The exclusive 
"friend/enemy-thinking", promulgated by Schmitt (1996/32) and fuelled by "hate", comes 
with "apocalyptic terrorism which pushes toward 'the last battle'" (Moltmann, 1973: 67). 
"The law of life of a Christian community", according to him, demands however the 
"'acceptance of the other' in his differentness" (91). 
Change without reconciliation leads to terrorism. Revolutionaries should recognize that 
today. For not until there is reconciliation will the compulsion of the evil deed which 
bears continuous evil be broken. Not until there is reconciliation will the devilish circle 
of revenge be destroyed. Not until there is reconciliation will the law of retaliation be 
conquered (92). 
"Love includes the opponent in its thoughts and affairs. It sees in him the reconciled and 
liberated friend of tomorrow" and has "a permanent mistrust against the justice of one's 
own position". Christians "cannot justify the use of power, for then they assume guilt which 
must be forgiven" (92-93). 
 Strangely, Moltmann is less squeamish in a 1969 speech in which he appears to be 
arguing in favour of revolutionary violence. "The problem of the use of violence or non-
violence is a fictitious problem [Scheinproblem]", he says (1969: 77; my translation; his 
italics). 
The only question is that after justified and unjustified use of violence ... power needs 
to be justified. Else it is naked violence. The use of revolutionary power must be 
legitimised by the humane goals of the revolution. ... If not all possible means are being 
made use of, the revolutionary future becomes implausible [unglaubwürdig]. ... The 
humane goals of the revolution may not be discredited through disproportionate use of 
violence (77-78; my translation; his italics). 
"All means are justified, but they must be different from and better than those of the 
enemy, in order to confuse the enemy" (79; my translation). 
 Although Moltmann claims to dislike Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction (Moltmann, 
1973: 67), it is not without reason that Schmitt concludes that "Moltmann is right when he 
stresses the intensely political meaning that is irreducibly contained in the worship of a ... 
crucified God and that cannot be sublimated into the 'mere theological'" (1970: 118).  
  Oliver O'Donovan, who when speaking of "political theology" most often seems to 
mean (revolutionary) Latin American liberation theology, argues that this "Southern school 
remains important for theologians in other contexts, despite its inability to address the 
major practical questions of the North" (1996: 21). We will therefore now take a closer look 
at non-Western political theologies. 
 
2.4.3  Liberation theologies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
 
2.4.3.1  Liberation theology, political theology, and the Church 
 
While Matthew 5:43-44 affirms: "You have heard that it was said: 'You shall love your 
neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those 
who persecute you" (USCCB, 1970), liberation theology, in accord with theology of 
revolution, appears to be focussing on love of neighbour to the detriment of love of enemy 
(for example, it is them, not us, who, although being "loved by God", "are constantly being 
called to conversion": Gutiérrez, 1993: 160). Liberation theology thus sometimes shows an 
unforgivingness, even vindictiveness, that reminds one of the (Jewish) Old Testament 
more than of the (Christian) New Testament. 
 In the following I will be focussing on the socio-political analysis advanced by those 
who designate themselves as liberation theologians (including "black theology" in Africa, 
"theology of struggle" and "minjung theology" in Asia). It has to be noted that documents 
along argumentatively similar lines and critical of social and political conditions in Latin 
America and other parts of the world may have been issued by Church authorities, for 
example episcopal conferences, that did not (want to) identify themselves as writing in the 
tradition of either liberation or political theology and are therefore not subject to my 
analysis. (On the other hand, Segundo means to know that the adoption of "the 
terminology of liberation" by "ecclesiastical authorities ... has led to a watering down of its 
content, so that the language of liberation is emptied of all real meaning": 1976: 4.) 
 Gustavo Gutiérrez, the first and foremost liberation theologian, in what is arguably 
the most important book of liberation theology, A theology of liberation, published in the 
original in 1971, explicitly refers to Metz' political theology (1993: 126-130; as does Juan 
Luis Segundo in The liberation of theology when he says that "a very respectable and 
scientific 'political theology' does presently exist in Europe": 1976: 70). Gutiérrez also 
notices "the rather abstract level on which the political sphere is at times treated in Metz's 
writings" (1993: 129; equally Segundo, 1976: 144-145, on Metz and Moltmann; and Alves 
on Moltmann: see Fiorenza, 1975: 24) and attributes this to the fact that 
the climate in which his reflections develop is far from the revolutionary ferment of the 
Third World countries, he cannot penetrate the situation of dependency, injustice, and 
exploitation in which most of humankind finds itself. His conception of the political 
sphere lacks what could be acquired both by the experience of the confrontations and 
conflicts stemming from the rejection of this oppression of some persons by others and 
of some countries by others, as well as by the experience of the aspiration to liberation 
which emerges from the heart of these conditions (Gutiérrez, 1993: 129). 
A defining difference between liberation theology and political theology is, according to 
Gutiérrez, that "[f]aith, the Gospel, the Church, have in Latin America a complex public 
dimension" that they have lost in Europe (1993: 129; although Segundo seems to think 
that the "majority Christianity" in Latin America is "of very low religious caliber" and only "a 
minority Christianity" has a "much more profound grasp of the Christian message ..., 
however much one may accuse it of being class-conscious and intellectualistic": 1976: 
185; this is confirmed by Löwy, 1996: 48-49). In Europe, "the universal existence of a 
secularized world and the privatization of the faith seem to have been taken for granted by 
political theology without further critical examination". While Gutiérrez attests Metz to react 
"to a conformist theology" in Europe, he admits that religion in Latin America also "played 
(and still plays) an important role in support of the established order, although currently it 
seems to be withdrawing its support – with unforeseeable consequences" (Gutiérrez, 
1993: 129-130). Latin America is "a continent in which socio-economic structures are in 
the service of the powerful and work against the weak of society" (xxx; Camara speaks of 
an "inner colonialism" of "a small number of privileged in a country" who enjoy their wealth 
at the expense of "millions of their countrymen": 1969: 261) and "[p]eople are ... painfully 
aware that a large part of the Church is in one way or another linked to those who wield 
economic and political power" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 40; he goes as far as to speak of "the 
moral failure of an institution which seems to be on the verge of bankruptcy": 141). Joan 
Casañas sees "traditional Christianity chained to capitalism" (1983: 119) and defies "any 
landholding and fascist bishop in Latin America" (124), and Segundo claims that "at a 
certain moment in history the Church stopped listening to the voice of Christ and began to 
listen to the voice of the ruling classes and their selfish interests" instead (1976: 42). 
Today, 
[t]he dominant groups, who have always used the Church to defend their interests and 
maintain their privileged position, ... – as they see 'subversive' tendencies gaining 
ground in the heart of the Christian community – call for a return to the purely religious 
and spiritual function of the Church (Gutiérrez, 1993: 41). 
Too long, in Gutiérrez opinion, "as a result of a Latin American cultural tradition imposed 
by colonization, theology as practiced among us simply echoed the theology developed in 
Europe" (xxviii). It is then strange to see that liberation theology seems to be echoing the 
new political theology of Metz, once more developed in Europe. (Along similar lines, 
Segundo, 1976, speaks out against the use of Western concepts in Latin America just to 
continue unabashedly to employ Marxist perspectives and the hermeneutic circle – also 
without ever pausing to think that in an hermeneutic circle non-"liberation" interpretations 
would be just as valid – and so on.) Gutiérrez does not want liberation theology to be seen 
as "as the radical, political wing of European progressive theology" though (1993: xxix) 
and Segundo thinks that they do "not have a great deal in common" because liberation 
theology derives directly from "man's most urgent problems" rather than from theological 
speculation (1976: 81; see also Araya G., 1983: 105). 
 
2.4.3.2  Dependency and development, democracy and capitalism 
 
It is not possible to distinguish a clear-cut socio-political analysis in Gutiérrez. This may be 
because he thinks that "[t]he ultimate reason for commitment to the poor and oppressed is 
not to be found in the social analysis we use, or in human compassion, or in any direct 
experience we ourselves may have of poverty", but in the Christians' "theocentric, 
prophetic option that has its roots in the unmerited love of God and is demanded by this 
love" (1993: xxvii). Gutiérrez heavily relies on others' theories, and, to some extent, 
presents them as his own (just as Segundo, 1976, does not acknowledge the origins of the 
"hermeneutic circle"), for example "class analysis" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 54) and dependency 
theory, a theory of the causes of underdevelopment very much in vogue throughout the 
developing world in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1971, he unequivocally holds that the status 
of the "rich countries ... is the fruit of injustice and coercion" (14) and "underdevelopment is 
only the by-product of the development of other countries, because of the kind of 
relationship which exists between the rich and the poor countries" (17; see also Boff, 1995: 
276; according to Hinkelammert, "[t]he exploitation of the Third World" guarantees "the 
social gains of labor movements in First World countries", their "high wages and generous 
social spending": 1983: 189), although he relativates this in the foreword to a later edition 
of his book when saying that dependency theory "does not take sufficient account of the 
internal dynamics of each country or of the vast dimensions of the world of the poor" and 
has become "an inadequate tool" as "the world economy has evolved" and new factors 
had to be taken into account (Gutiérrez, 1993: xxiv). 
 Gutiérrez does however not approve of the Western concept of "development" – 
particularly when "approached from an economic and modernizing point of view" (17) – 
altogether: "It is my opinion that the term development does not well express these 
profound aspirations" (xiv; his italics) of the Latin American people "to overcome material 
insufficiency and misery ... in order to achieve a more human society" (14).  
In the final analysis, poverty means death: lack of food and housing, the inability to 
attend properly to health and education needs, the exploitation of workers, permanent 
unemployment, the lack of respect for one's human dignity, and unjust limitations 
placed on personal freedom in the areas of self-expression, politics, and religion. 
Poverty is a situation that destroys peoples, families, and individuals (xxi). 
Leonardo Boff specifies "malnutrition; a high infant mortality rate; endemic diseases; low 
income; ... lack of social security; lack of health care, hospitals, schools, and housing 
facilities" as what "is commonly called underdevelopment" (1995: 268). Franz 
Hinkelammert laments that "countries, with their natural resources, are being despoiled, 
destroyed, and plundered", with "hundreds of thousands" having "to leave their homes and 
wander about the country, living from beggary" (1983: 175), while "there are concentration 
camps everywhere to terrorize the dominated classes". The rich countries "maintain their 
own so-called political freedoms while overturning and destroying the most basic human 
rights in most countries of the underdeveloped world" (174). 
 "Development ... has been frequently promoted by international organizations closely 
linked to groups and governments which control the world economy" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 17) 
and as a result the world is now "experiencing a profound and rapid socio-cultural 
transformation" (13). While "[t]he old forms of imperialistic presence ... still exist" (for 
example, mining and plantations), "currently foreign investment is gravitating towards the 
modern sector of the economy ..., binding it ever more closely to international capitalism. 
In this way a new kind of dependence arises, less apparent, but no less real". The 
economic interest groups now discernable across Latin America have acquired "the 
character of great multinational corporations" (52; the term "multinational corporations" is 
also being used by others, for example Hinkelammert, 1983: 178) and "countries are being 
kept in a condition of neocolonialism" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 64; the term "neocolonialism" is 
being used by others too, for example Assmann, 1969: 226; my translation) with "the 
centers of decision-making ... to be found outside the continent" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 64). 
 Almeri Bezerra de Melo ranks all forms of "development aid" – such as "technical 
cooperation" and "loans" – among the new "instruments of control and economic and 
political domination" (1969: 250; my translation). Hinkelammert succours him, holding the 
"International Monetary Fund (IMF)" responsible for "the current subjugation of Third World 
countries" inasmuch "as all these countries have debts that they cannot pay" (1983: 177). 
The IMF missions plot the destruction of the human being and of nature, nature being 
the future life of humans. Hence, they leave a trail of blood behind them: the blood of 
the poor, which they convert into money, which is the blood of their economy, the blood 
of the Leviathan. The sound of the dollar becomes a cry of terror (178). 
Segundo seems to contradict this however by arguing that 
the hope of Latin American countries does not lie in an impossible attempt to preserve 
their more primitive cultures, however much respect we may show for their humane 
values and their proper pace of transformation. The only road open to them is to pass 
through the modernization that is a precondition for survival to a revolution that will 
thoroughly and radically humanize the social structures of the population as a whole 
(1976: 202). 
One cannot but wonder whether Boff's 1972 analysis of the short-comings of "modern" 
Western society does not refute such expectations: 
The utopia of a global consumer society, a society without dire needs, revealed itself as 
truly illusionary. Technology, instead of liberating, enslaved people in the most subtle 
form. Urban society and secular empirical technology, instead of creating greater 
conditions of personal liberty, restricted citizens ever more thoroughly (1995: 29). 
The (Marxist) revolution that would change this situation, in line with Segundo's hopes for 
Latin America, never became reality in the West and Boff therefore argues against "the 
myth of progress in the capitalist mould" (269) which "benefits only some strata of the 
population, marginalizing broader sectors. ... The social tax of inequality levied by modern 
progress is immense, and is paid by the common masses" (1985: 7; Assmann, 1969: 226, 
emphasizes this by giving the example of Brazil; see also Hinkelammert, 1983: 175, on the 
human drawbacks of economic and production reforms in other Latin American and 
African countries). Hugo Assmann, again slightly shifting the perspective, thinks that there 
are "countries that are being kept underdeveloped" (1969: 224; my translation) and that 
most of them are on an "increasingly regressive, by no means progressive, way" (225; my 
translation). 
  Eleazar Fernandez, from the Philippines, in Toward a theology of struggle, links 
capitalism to an "elite democracy" in the West: in "capitalist-liberal democracy" "you have 
dictatorship by the few – the wealthy and the powerful". "Deceptive and elusive are fitting 
descriptions" of the socio-political system of "the core capitalist-democratic countries, like 
the United States", that hide the "system's crimes against the people" by blaming the 
victims (1994: 92-93; his italics). Segundo finds equally worrying that in Latin America 
democratic governments are being overthrown "by military dictatorships which can keep 
discontent under control though they may not be able to control its cause" (1976: 4). 
  In an article dated 1987 (but apparently written much later as it speaks of the fall of 
communism and uses the language of the anti-globalization movement of the late nineties 
and early 2000s), Yong-Bok Kim, a major representative of Korean "minjung theology", 
deplores that "[a]ll life on earth is now condemned to the global market" with "no realistic 
option for life outside of" it left (1987b: par. 6). Even "nation states ... are ... losing control 
over the economic life of their own people" to "corporate entities of capital ... controlling 
modern science and technology as well as information and communication" (par. 8; which 
"hi-tech" media, in turn, control "economic, political and cultural" "feelings and perceptions 
of the people" in an "intensive and brutally effective" manner: 1989: par. 75). Social safety 
nets, where they exist, "are rapidly eroded in the name of the open market". "The 
economic victimization of the people ... will be absolute and limitless in the global market", 
he predicts (1987b: par. 10). In a 1989 dated piece (implausibly mentioning the first gulf 
war), he adds that "giant transnational corporations ... create arbitrary needs among 
consumers" (1989: par. 84), stereotyping "people of low social class or status" (par. 90) as 
"lazy or violent; dirty and ignorant" (par. 91) and "as second-class humans in religious and 
cultural terms, as well as in socio-economic terms" (par. 90). 
 
2.4.3.3  Liberation and Marxism 
 
Rather than of "development", Gutiérrez prefers to speak of "economic, social, and political 
liberation" (1993: 55; my italics): 
Liberation ... expresses the inescapable moment of radical change which is foreign to 
the ordinary use of the term development. Only in the context of such a process can a 
policy of development be effectively implemented, have any real meaning, and avoid 
misleading formulations (17; his italics). 
People "should 'feel their hunger' and become aware that this hunger is due to a situation 
which the Gospel repudiates". That is the "politicizing function" of the Gospel (153). 
Gutiérrez sees liberation theology as a "critical reflection on humankind" (9), standing in 
"the struggle to construct a just and fraternal society, where persons can live with dignity 
and be the agents of their own destiny" (xiv). The current "state of affairs is offensive to 
humankind and therefore to God" (40). He gives the example of Moses, the "liberator", 
who was called by God to lead the Jewish people out of unjust oppression, enslavement 
and "alienated work" in Egypt (88; see Segundo, 1976: 116-117, for an attempt to 
rationalize this analogy). "[I]n liberation theology, faith and life are inseparable" (Gutiérrez, 
1993: xix). While Assmann demands a "prophetic theology" that "will not shy away from 
the political consequences of its language" (1969: 232; my translation), Gutiérrez says the 
"kingdom of peace", announced by the prophets, "presupposes the establishment of 
justice". He stresses that "[p]eace, justice, love, and freedom" are not a private matter, 
they are "social realities" and "eschatological promises" with all that implies for the conduct 
of Christians and the Church. "[T]he struggle for a just society is in its own right very much 
a part of salvation history" (1993: 97). "Far from showing no interest in this liberation, 
Jesus rather placed it on a deeper level, with far-reaching consequences" (134). For 
Segundo, as for Schmitt (see 1985/22: 2), "[e]very theology is political, even one that does 
not speak or think in political terms. The influence of politics on theology and every other 
cultural sphere cannot be evaded" (Segundo, 1976: 74). For him, "there is no such thing 
as Christian theology or a Christian interpretation of the gospel message in the absence of 
a prior political commitment" (94-95). "We can only have an authentic faith ... when we 
have committed ourselves to an authentic struggle" (97).  
 "Sin" has "collective dimensions" that are "evident ... in concrete instances, in 
particular alienations" such as domination, oppression, and exploitation, says  Gutiérrez 
(1993: 102-103). Boff claims: "Where social analysis says 'structural poverty,' faith will say 
'structural sin.' Where analysis says 'private accumulation of wealth,' faith will say 'sin of 
selfishness.'" (1985: 9). "Sin demands a radical liberation, which in turn necessarily implies 
a political liberation" (Gutiérrez, 1993: 103). Distinct dimensions of liberation, according to 
Gutiérrez, are: "economic, social, and political liberation; liberation which leads to the 
creation of a new humanity in a new society of solidarity; and liberation from sin and 
entrance into communion with God and with all persons" (137; Boff agrees: "The salvation 
proclaimed by Christianity is an all-embracing one. It is not restricted to economic, political, 
social, and ideological emancipation, but neither can it be realized without them": 1995: 
275). 
 In his book, Jesus Christ liberator, Boff criticizes 
the traditional images of Christ that do not foster liberation, that tend instead to prop up 
the whole process of colonization and domination. ... The Virgin pierced with a sword of 
sorrow personifies the submission and domination of women; her tears of sorrow are 
for her children slain in the colonizer's quest for power and gold. Similar criticisms can 
be made of the imperial and monarchical Christs crowned with gold, or of Christ the 
warrior king; these images seem to hearken back to the glorious kings of Spain and 
Portugal (1995: 271). 
Instead, Boff holds, Jesus "rejects wealth, viewing it dialectically" (avant la lettre, one 
supposes) "as a result of the exploitation of the poor and regarding it as outright dishonest 
(Luke 16:9). Jesus' ideal is not a society of affluence or one of poverty but a society of 
justice and brotherhood" (285). Boff envisages "an organization of society based on 
everyone's labor, with everyone sharing, in the means and the goods of production as well 
as in the means of power. And this is called liberation" (1985: 8). J. Severino Croatto 
stresses the need for people in Latin America to experience "God as their liberator" as did 
the Jews in Egypt (1983: 43; "God is the resistance leader against the despotic and 
imperial powers": Kim, 1987a: par. 93). Casañas refuses the idea of an "Omnipotent who, 
because he so chooses, shelves his omnipotence and allows himself to be oppressed and 
massacred with the people for the alleged reason that it is love that must conquer" (1983: 
116) because it has nothing to offer to the activist who stands in "anti-capitalist revolution" 
(119) – "(long may it live!)" (120).  
 Gutiérrez deplores that "[l]iving in a capitalist society" has "placed some Christians 
among the oppressed and persecuted and others among the oppressors and persecutors, 
some among the tortured and others among the torturers or those who condone torture" 
(1993: 75). This means, according to Segundo, "that Christians of whatever denomination 
feel closer to those who" also engage in the struggle for liberation "than they do to other 
members of their own denomination". Liberation theology thus is inherently "ecumenical 
theology" and even "extends beyond the boundaries of Christianity, in fact, uniting all men 
of good will" (1976: 149-150). Only "within the framework of the worldwide class struggle" 
(Gutiérrez, 1993: 54) can "the untenable circumstances of poverty, alienation, and 
exploitation" be overcome (55). Latin America's "own development will come about only 
with a struggle to break the domination of the rich countries" (17) and classes. Marxists 
and Christians face "a common adversary", Gutiérrez claims (60; while Segundo demands 
"a new interpretation" of "the Christian message favoring the class struggle of the 
proletariat": 1976: 17): all "the problems are rooted in the structures of capitalist society" 
(Gutiérrez, 1993: 65). Unequivocally, Boff, who left the Franciscan Order in 1992 and 
became a lay theologian in order to escape Roman confinement (Löwy, 1996: 89), admits 
that "Christian faith helps a person choose a particular instrument of social analysis ... the 
Christian ideal is closer to socialism than to capitalism" (Boff, 1985: 10), and Ernesto 
Cardenal, who calls himself "a Marxist for Christ and his gospel" and "a revolutionary for 
the sake of his kingdom", argues that Jesus "did not tell us which scientific methods to use 
in order to arrive at the goal" of "perfect humanity" and that "[t]here's no incompatibility 
between Christianity and Marxism ... a scientific method for studying society and changing 
it" (Cabestrero, 1983: 31-32). Kim thinks that "one can say that Marxism has played an 
important role in the theological development in recent years. Perhaps its role can be 
compared to the role of Aristotle in the theology of Thomas Aquinas" (n. d.: par. 35). 
 Ernesto's brother, Fernando Cardenal, sees the presence of a priest in the revolution 
(in his case as National Vice-Coordinator of the Sandinista Youth Movement in Nicaragua) 
as "a sermon in itself, a witness, an ecclesial and pastoral sign" (Cabestrero, 1983: 53), 
trying to help bring alive, "for the first time in history, ... a socialism that wouldn't be anti-
Christian or anticlerical" (64). For Camilo Torres, "[r]evolution is ... the way to obtain a 
government that will feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and teach the unschooled. ... This 
is why the revolution is not only permissible but obligatory" for Christians (1973: 374). 
Casañas urges us not to be "on the theological lookout to fit" the language of revolutionary 
action, "from its first stammers onward, into categories, formulas, and patterns of the Bible 
or of subsequent Christian tradition" (1983: 120). For "the Christian Marxist activist" (126) 
"the first and last goal is neither to remain in the church nor to speak about the matter of 
God in a revolutionary way, but rather to carry on the revolution as soon as possible, and 
well" (129). 
 
2.4.3.4  Revolution and violence 
 
Segundo thinks that "[w]e are fortunate that our God takes a stand in history, and our 
interpretation of his word must follow the same path" (1976: 27). He urges that 
"theologizing" must become a "dangerous" activity again (26; compare this to Metz' 
"dangerous memory": 1980: 90). Indeed, for many liberation theologians it seems to be: 
Frequently in Latin America today certain priests are considered 'subversive.' Many are 
under surveillance or are being sought by the police. Others are in prison, have been 
expelled from their country (Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic are 
significant examples), or have been murdered by terrorist anti-communist groups. For 
the defenders of the status quo, 'priestly subversion' is surprising. They are not used to 
it. The political activity of some leftist groups, we might say, is – within certain limits – 
assimilated and tolerated by the system and is even useful to it to justify some of its 
repressive measures; the dissidence of priests and religious, however, appears as 
particularly dangerous, especially if we consider the role which they have traditionally 
played (Gutiérrez, 1993: 62). 
The brothers Cardenal may be seen as an example of this type of priest. The Nicaraguan 
government described their activities as "part of the guerrilla struggle, or 'terrorism and 
communism,' as they called it", according to Fernando Cardenal (Cabestrero, 1983: 62), 
who values "the opportunity of daily risking my life for the cause of the poor" as Jesus 
"risked his life for these same persons, and actually died for them" (80; see Gerassi, 1973: 
11-22, for examples of other priest-revolutionaries in various Latin American countries). 
 Assmann believes in "just use of violence [gerechten Gewaltanwendung]" (1969: 
243; my translation), for example in cases "where extreme use of violence takes place in 
order to overcome violence" – by which he means "the defence of the oppressed against 
the oppressing powers that is motivated by true 'love of neighbour'". In a somewhat 
convoluted paragraph, he gives the impression to see the use of violence in this way as a 
"positive" "fundamental decision" made by the Christian "with historic realism" (242; my 
translation) who is faced with "institutionalised violence" such as hunger and malnutrition 
that produce "worldwide 30 million" of "violently killed victims [gewaltsam Ermordeten]" 
every year (244; my translation). In this sense, the revolutionary use of violence may help 
to overcome violence "more concretely and more seriously" than "passive" non-violence 
(245; my translation). Bezerra de Melo points out that the Church only condones the 
concepts of "just war" and "'legitimate violence'" exercised by state authorities to uphold 
"existing power relations" (1969: 256; my translation), while Gutiérrez warns of "falling into 
the pitfalls of a double standard which assumes that violence is acceptable when the 
oppressor uses it to maintain 'order' and is bad when the oppressed invoke it to change 
this 'order.'" (1993: 63-64). Helder Camara respects "those who feel that their conscience 
obliges them to decide for use of violence" if they are willing to pay for their "sincerity 
[Aufrichtigkeit] with the sacrifice of their lives". He names Torres and Che Guevara. He 
also says that he personally prefers "a thousand times to be killed rather than to kill" as 
this was his "personal calling" (1969: 267; my translation). "Archbishop Oscar Romero, 
whose stand against the U.S.-supported junta in El Salvador led to his assassination while 
he was saying mass, is only one of thousands who have paid the price of death so that 
finally others may live" (Brown, 1987: xix-xx). Ernesto Cardenal calls the Cuban revolution 
"love for neighbour – the gospel in action" and describes how Christians in Nicaragua were 
"evolving" from non-violence to use of violence: comparing the situation to "Hitler's 
Germany", they "saw that in Nicaragua an armed struggle was becoming more and more 
necessary" (Cabestrero, 1983: 27). An often cited case is Camilo Torres, styled the 
"revolutionary priest", who was killed in action. While early on he said "No, we do not want 
violence. We do not want to use force. But we do want majority rule" (1973: 370), this later 
turned into: "our final objective – the seizure of power by the people, whatever the cost" 
(415). After joining the guerrillas, he announced in an open letter that he meant "to 
continue the struggle, arms in hand, until power has been won by the people" (423), "the 
popular classes" – "NOT ONE STEP BACK! LIBERATION OR DEATH!" (424-425; his 
capitals). 
 Buti Tlhagale, now Archbishop of Johannesburg, once wrote, in the context of the 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa and in an article entitled Christian soldiers, that 
many passages of the New Testament demanding non-violence of Christians and indeed 
"the entire Sermon on the Mount do not make sense in the face of continuing repression 
and the barbarous behaviour of the servants of the state and also tend to cultivate fatalistic 
attitudes among the oppressed" (1987: 87). He deplores "that the gospel ... makes no 
room for the use of violence to right the wrongs of society remains a massive scandal 
among the oppressed" (88), while Charles Villa-Vicencio says that 
an ecumenical consensus has ... emerged in relation to a theological response to 
revolution. It is a cautious consensus which does not promote revolutionary violence 
but seeks rather to understand it as an inevitable response to a situation where 
violence is already part of the existing order (1987a: 244). 
His scholarly contribution argues that "[a]bsolute pacifism has never been more than a 
minority theme within Christendom, although always one that haunts the more dominant 
tradition of reluctant if justified violence" being permitted (245-246) as "justice may not be 
possible without violence" (249). He gives the theme an interesting twist though when 
saying that  
[t]his is not because the weak are inherently less avaricious, potentially less 
exploitative, or intrinsically more egalitarian than the powerful. It is rather because 
social and historical circumstances are such that they are prevented from being 
avaricious, exploitative and class-dominant (249; see also Schall, 1982: 126). 
"[R]evolutionary violence" is more justified than "institutionalised violence" only because 
the former "is an attempt to destroy existing evil" whereas the latter "is designed to 
entrench it, and ultimately because institutionalised violence always precedes and 
precipitates revolutionary violence". Revolutionary violence fulfils "[t]he task of the 
Christian ... to eliminate the major source of evil" as long as this is being "accomplished 
with a minimum loss of life" (251). Segundo thinks that "Jesus is urging us to use the least 
amount of violence compatible with truly effective love" (1976: 166), while coming "to the 
logical and obvious – but scandalous – conclusion that the end justifies the means. ... 
Christian morality is precisely a morality of ends ... that are the most communitarian and 
generous-hearted ends imaginable" (171-172). 
 Radical Muslims, even Islamist terrorists, might not contradict such a statement if 
applied to Islam. 
 
 
CHAPTER  3:  THE  POLITICO-THEOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  RADICAL  ISLAM 
 
3.1  "Democracy/Capitalism" versus Islam 
 
In the third chapter I will be looking at statements by leading representatives of terrorist 
movements gathered from the Internet and submit the emerging discourse to an analysis 
in accordance with the concerns of "political theology" as outlined in the last chapter. I will 
focus on key themes such as "democracy", "capitalism", "globalization", "colonialism" and 
"underdevelopment". This will allow me, in subsequent chapters, to compare the socio-
political (or arguably rather politico-theological) analysis advanced by radical Islam to the 
socio-political analysis of Christian proponents of political and liberation theologies. 
 In this chapter, brackets inside quotes (save such indicating capitalization and [sic]) 
and italics are always the original author's or have been inserted into the original text by a 
translator or the Internet source I took the translation from. 
 I have proposed elsewhere (Kofmel, 2004) that if someone wants to fight capitalism, 
and maybe sees globalization as today's primary manifestation of it, one needs to 
abandon democracy and its values first. Social and political theory (such as liberal theory, 
modernization theory and a number of socialist theorists) as well as historical and 
empirical evidence suggest that capitalism and democracy are inextricably linked. One 
cannot fight capitalism, it seems, and replace it with any form of grassroots democracy 
because every form of democracy, in turn, leads to capitalism. Being anti-capitalist, it 
appears, one needs to be anti-democratic as well. In contrast to the grassroots-democratic 
anti-/alter-globalization movement, non-democratic movements such as the terrorist 
network of al-Qaeda fully recognize this fact. 
 With the Christian religion, the British website Al Muhajiroun argues, 
Democracy/Capitalism calls the people to the creed of 'Give what belongs to Caesar to 
Caesar and give what belongs to God to God'. Allah ... on the other hand says, '... His 
are all things that are in the heavens and all that are on Earth ...' ..., including Caesar 
and his throne (2004f: par. 9). 
"Democracy/Capitalism is firmly rooted in the concept of secularism, of separation" of 
church and state, of faith, "and consequently Allah ..., from life. This is the cornerstone of 
their ideology and it is the antithesis of the Islamic belief", they hold (par. 10). Al-Qaeda 
leader Osama bin Laden seconds in an audio message broadcast by the independent Al-
Jazeera satellite channel television, the transcript of which was posted on the website of 
al-Qaeda's Center for Islamic Studies and Research (CISR) (Why War?, 2004: par. 2), that 
"the religion of Islam encompasses all the affairs of life, including the religious and the 
worldly, such as economic, military, and political affairs" (in Why War?, 2004: par. 67). 
"They want Islam to play the role of Christianity, Judaism, or Buddhism, a passive creed 
which accepts to be overwhelmed by the creed of Democracy/Capitalism" (Al Muhajiroun, 
2004f: par. 26). But "Islam is based on guidance from Allah ... to conduct all the affairs of 
the people" (par. 10), "a complete system of life with its own unique political, social, and 
economic system" (par. 26). 
 With "American secularism" being "imposed forcefully" upon the Middle East, "[t]he 
Islamic world will change from dictatorships to democracy, which means sub-human 
degradation in all walks of life" and a serious threat to "the dominance of Shari'a [Islamic 
law]", according to Al-Neda (in MEMRI, 2003e: par. 6), a website affiliated to al-Qaeda 
(MEMRI, 2003e: par. 2). 
America is the head of heresy in our modern world, and it leads an infidel democratic 
regime that is based upon separation of religion and state and on ruling the people by 
the people via legislating laws that contradict the way of Allah and permit what Allah 
has prohibited. This compels the other countries to act in accordance with the same 
laws in the same ways ... and punishes any country [that rebels against these laws] by 
besieging it, and then by boycotting it. By so doing, [America] seeks to impose on the 
world a religion that is not Allah's (Suleiman Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par. 13), 
namely the "money religion". Abu Gheith is identified as an al-Qaeda spokesman who 
posted some articles on the CISR website which replaced al-Neda (MEMRI, 2002c: par. 
2). Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi too speaks of "a world of material globalization and money-
worshipping" (2002: par. 141) and Abu Ayman al-Hilali of "the worship of neoliberalism and 
democracy" (2002: par. 274). 
The Americans' intentions have also become clear in statements about the need to 
change the beliefs, curricula, and morals of Muslims to become more tolerant, as they 
put it. In clearer terms, it is a religious-economic war. They want the believers to desist 
from worshipping God so that they can enslave them, occupy their countries, and loot 
their wealth. It is strange that they want to dictate democracy and Americanize our 
culture through their jet bombers (bin Laden in Why War?, 2004: par. 8). 
Abu-Muhammad al-Ablaj, responsible for the training of al-Qaeda members (Why War?, 
2003a: par. 2), said in an electronic message sent to the Dubai correspondent of the 
London-based Saudi-owned weekly Al-Majallah (par. 37): "Americans want a misfit 
religion, a 'modern Islam'" (in Why War?, 2003a: par. 6). 
 
3.2  "Globalization/Americanization" 
 
It is quite common for the terrorists to speak of (and confuse) "globalization/ 
Americanization" (for example al-Hilali, 2002: par. 234). While "two powers have 
dominated the world in all ages" (CISR, 2003: par. 16), "[t]he United States has been able 
to deviate from this rule" (par. 18), as a book holds that was published by CISR on the 
Internet. "[T]he political and economic collapse of communism cleared the way for it to 
spread its gospel without heed or constraint" (Abu Sa'd Al-Amili, 2002: par. 343), and now 
"the US world order wants to destroy Islam universally in order for even this to be replaced 
by the capitalism ideology since it sees Islam as the only real challenge to global 
hegemony" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004d: par. 7). 
 The United States 
got rid of the restrictions, which the conflict with the Soviet Union had imposed on it, 
and adopted a new policy. This policy is summed up in taking a direct approach to 
secure its interests in the world without regard to the interests of others, because it 
considers itself the sole power in the world and the world should adapt to what it wants 
(CISR, 2003: par. 20). 
In a collection of essays also published as a book on the Internet (Majallat al-Ansar, 2002), 
al-Hilali claims that "[c]ultural globalization imposes the United States' culture and way of 
life through US schools and restaurants" (2002: par. 202), while "[e]ducational 
globalization" achieves the same through means such as development aid (par. 201). 
Economic globalization links the global economy to the United States for ultimate 
control over capital through World Trade Organization, transnational corporations, the 
IMF, and the World Bank. Political globalization entails direct political interference in 
various countries, the division of the world into geopolitical regions, the creation of a 
strategic framework based on vital interests, the imposition of economic sanctions on 
those who resist (under the pretext that they practice terror, human rights violations, 
and political despotism), and protection for the children of Zion and all of their allies 
through the veto weapon (par. 199-200). 
The latter referring to the United States' veto power in the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the West's interests are, in al-Hilali's view, protected by "[s]ecurity globalization" 
(par. 203). In a "sham global democracy" (par. 274), "[t]he United Nations acts as the 
executive branch of US policy" (par. 264), making "laws for relations between the masters 
of veto and the slaves of the General Assembly", the common members, with the aim "to 
deceive and exploit peoples", says bin Laden (in BBC, 2004: par. 24) according to the 
transcript of an audiotape broadcast by Al-Jazeera and the pan-Arab Al-Arabiya satellite 
channel (BBC, 2004: par. 2-3). 
 In "moving earnestly to Americanize the entire world", the United States seek 
"forcefully to impose a system on the countries of the world similar to the systems 
governments impose on individuals" (CISR, 2003: par. 88). 
 Naming the highly regarded anti-/alter-globalization activist Walden Bello as a source 
for his criticism (al-Qirshi, 2002: par. 191), al-Qirshi speaks of "the US empire" (par. 162) – 
the very words Sayf al-Din al-Ansari uses (2002: par. 101). 
One of the most important tools to control countries of the world was the World Trade 
Agreement project, which was the hanging rope for the economic independence of any 
state and its liberation from American hegemony. However, this project failed, thank 
God, after the heroes hit the Trade Towers in the 11 September operation (CISR, 
2003: par. 92). 
What the non-violent mass protests of "Seattle" for the anti-/alter-globalization movement, 
are the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon for the terrorist movements – a major victory over the apparently invincible world 
power, the United States. 
 Not wholly surprisingly, the terrorists seek a common front with the anti-/ alter-
globalization movement, speaking of 
the rising consciousness in what people say and in the popular marches condemning 
US-Zionist terror, in the demonstrations opposing globalization/Americanization, and in 
the operations that target their symbols. The downtrodden, oppressed, and destitute 
are united in their fight against US-Zionist tyranny (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 314). 
"The Islamic nation is struggling against globalization, and it continues with its negative 
attitude towards Western rhetoric and explanations", says Abu 'Ubeid Al-Qurashi (in 
MEMRI, 2002b: par. 8), a close aid to bin Laden (MEMRI, 2002a: par. 2), in a column he 
wrote for al-Qaeda's online magazine Al-Ansar – For the Struggle Against the Crusader 
War (MEMRI, 2002b: par. 2). 
The slogans of reconciliation and cooperation are Western slogans. They are being 
used to crush the resistance. The Western civilization has launched a fierce war 
against the other civilizations. The Westerners are calling on others to surrender ... 
They want their civilization to be the dominant one in the world. ... They are trying to 
impose their way of life on the poor peoples (Gulboddin Hekmatyar in MEMRI, 2003a: 
par. 40). 
Hekmatyar, quoted from an interview in the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat, fought 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and later joined with his group Hezb-e-Islami 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda in fighting the Americans and other international troops in that 
country (MEMRI, 2003a: par. 2). He claimed that "the war between the civilizations has 
indeed begun, and this war will continue forever" (in MEMRI, 2003a: par. 40). 
The advocates of globalization/Americanization are not content with their own blatant 
corruption and atheism. They want to impose it by force on all humanity, including 
those who have accepted God's law and implemented it on their land (al-Hilali, 2002: 
par. 234). 
 
3.3  Colonialism and moral corruption 
 
The terrorists also confound (perhaps with intent) globalization and colonialism. "The 
Muslim countries today are colonized. Colonialism is either direct or veiled" (CISR, 2003: 
par. 24). 
The [Arab] nation-states ... are a Western model that the West created to allow it to 
build up its general colonialist plan for the Islamic East. These countries have no 
religious foundation, and have neither a right to exist nor a popular base. They were 
forced upon the Muslim peoples, and their survival is linked to the Western forces that 
created them (Louis Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2003k: par. 36).  
Attiya Allah is described as one of al-Qaeda's leading ideologues (MEMRI, 2003k: par. 11) 
and gave an interview to another of the organization's online magazines, The Voice of 
Jihad (par. 5), a biweekly launched by al-Qaeda supporters in Saudi Arabia (MEMRI, 
2004d: par. 2). The Muslim Nation, he said, is "denied the position in the World Arena as 
One Ummah, One Nation, One State [Ummatun Wahidah], as our Blessed Lands that 
have been carved and severed into smaller entities, remain disunited and divided" (Al 
Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 20). 
 Historically, with colonialism "[s]ecularism and Westernization held sway throughout 
the Islamic world" (al-Qirshi, 2002: par. 120). "The republics and kingdoms" artificially 
created by the colonisers "embraced several earthly religions in the region, like pan-
Arabism, socialism, communism, democracy, and other doctrines" (bin Laden in Why 
War?, 2004: par. 22). The consequence was, it is claimed, "the political impotence that has 
resulted from a reliance on such mythical concepts as civil society, political participation, 
and development" (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 265). 
 "Disunity, division and disarray" among the Muslim Nation "arose not just as a mere 
coincidence. The fall of Muslims ... was a direct result, a consequence, of the massive 
military, cultural and missionary savage invasion of the Muslim World by the" infidels (non-
Muslims), "such that, Muslim Land was torn apart and certain systems and ideologies were 
forced upon our lands, and these remain to exist today". The infidels "not only colonized 
the Muslim Land but also the Muslim Mind using Ideological Warfare, as foreign concepts 
and ideas were fused with the Ideology of Islam". They instilled "many diseases into the 
heart of the Muslim" Nation (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 21). "As Muslims we must be 
aware and vigilant of the conspiracy of the" infidels "to keep Muslims disunited. Their main 
aim and agenda is to destroy the Muslim" Nation "itself, either directly through military and 
economic coercion or indirectly using 'Ideological Warfare'" (par. 27). Speaking of the war 
in Iraq, the short-time leader of the Palestinian Hamas, Dr Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, who was 
assassinated by Israel, said in an article posted on the organization's website (MEMRI, 
2003b: par. 2) that the Western powers "are not satisfied with controlling the land and 
natural resources. Even if this is one of their goals, after the conquest of the land and the 
plundering of its natural resources they will target the faith of this nation" (in MEMRI, 
2003b: par. 18). "America wants to eradicate our identity and remove our religion from us" 
(Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 10). 
 The "foreign policy of the west" seeks 
to destroy everything and everyone in their path to gain power. Examples of this can be 
seen when the British and French colonialised [sic] the 'developing world'. Women 
were raped, Land and natural resources were pillaged and plundered and the rich were 
made richer whereas the poor became even poorer than before (Al Muhajiroun, 2004c: 
par. 19). 
Today's governments in the Middle East are seen as "traitor-collaborator Arab 
governments" installed "to take over resources of Muslims", each of them "a cliental 
government ... that follows its masters in Washington and Tel Aviv" (bin Laden in Al-
Jazeera, 2003a: par. 9) who "have succeeded in placing leaders over us that are 
treacherous and ruthless 'puppets', all part of a grand master plan" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: 
par. 26) – a "puppet regime" (Abu Gheith in Why War?, 2002: par. 18) and 
a cover for the colonialists. Colonialism is manifested [sic] in the economy, in the 
military bases ..., in political decision-making, and in international relations. Veiled 
colonialism has reached a point unmatched by direct colonialism (CISR, 2003: par. 41). 
"The matter of America's attempt to take over the world is not new. What is new is that it 
appears with such a grim face", told "Muslim Brotherhood" leader Muhammad Mahdi 
Othman 'Akef (in MEMRI, 2004e: par. 16) the independent Egyptian weekly Nadhat Misr 
(MEMRI, 2004e: par. 16), revealing "its contempt of others, and its aspiration to create 
facts on the ground" (al-Qurashi in MEMRI, 2003b: par. 3). "In the past, they fought 
secretly, and now they are fighting openly" (par. 17). The United States are in the Middle 
East "to secure the oil fields, in accordance with an old plan" (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 
2003k: par. 29). "For the big powers believe that the Gulf and the Gulf states are the key to 
controlling the world due to the presence of the largest oil reserves there" (bin Laden in 
Why War?, 2004: par. 8). The region is "occupied by American female soldiers", according 
to Suleiman Al-Dosari (in MEMRI, 2003g: par. 7), in an editorial written for The Voice of 
Jihad (MEMRI, 2003g: par. 4), "the [American] military headquarters in the" wars against 
Afghanistan and Iraq were "located in the Arabian Peninsula, and ... its logistical support 
was located in" Saudi Arabia (The Voice of Jihad editorial board in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 
31). In many countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia "the 
American planes take off whenever they want, with no prior notification, night or day", as 
bin Laden reminds (in MEMRI, 2003f: par. 22) in a speech posted in a number of Islamist 
Internet fora (MEMRI, 2003f: par. 2). 
 In Saudi Arabia, some neighbourhoods 
are full of American housing complexes ... There has been an agreement between the 
client government of the Land of the Two Holy Places and the United States that these 
complexes should be a piece of American land. Americans in them have religious 
freedom and are not forbidden anything of their religion and their desires. The 
complexes have churches and bars; they have dance halls and mixed swimming pools 
and various kinds of unbelief and licentiousness. Shari'ah law is not imposed on them; 
indeed, they are not subject to the sovereignty of the government itself. The police, 
security forces, and organizations that command virtue and forbid vice do not enter 
them (CISR, 2003: par. 219-220). 
They do also "not restrict access to these" "houses of immorality" "to themselves" but 
rather they are "opened by them to Muslim men and women", elaborates Bin-Nasir al-
Rashid (in CISR, 2003: par. 294) in another book (CISR, 2003: par. 240). Arab "TV 
companies ... mock Islam via documentaries, dramas, plays etc.", they show foreign 
"programs, alcohol advertising, uncovered women etc." – "what Allah forbids" (Al 
Muhajiroun, 2004l: par. 26). 
 The Americans "occupy the former capital of Islam", Baghdad (bin Laden in Al-
Jazeera, 2003a: par. 9), "the house of the caliphate, under the trick of weapons of mass 
destruction" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2004: par. 7). Treacherous clerics "ignore the bank 
towers next to the Al-Haram Mosque", the main mosque in Mecca, "that charge interest 
[which is forbidden in Islam]" (bin Laden in MEMRI, 2003f: par. 35). "The same – if not 
worse – is taking place in the other Muslim countries" and the diaspora (CISR, 2003: par. 
44). 
Desires and wealth is what prevented the people of the book from believing in the 
message of Islam as they feared a loss of food, property and money. They were fully 
aware that Islam condemns some of their economic transactions i. e. riba (interest) and 
any money that was earned in haraam (prohibited) means [sic] would need to be 
donated as sadaqah (charity) or Zakaat. The people of the book (Jews and Christians) 
did not want to donate their money to charity, nor stop dealing with riba (Al Muhajiroun, 
2004g: par. 8). 
But "[t]he one who is always concerned about money worships it, and the messenger 
Muhammad ... doomed the one who worships ... dinar (money) and women etc.", 
according to Al Muhajiroun (2004i: par. 29). Other "people grow up with certain worldly 
aspirations such as to get a top job, a position" (2004g: par. 18). "When they here [sic] 
free-mixing, cinemas, credit cards and mortgages etc. are haraam they will say 'I wonder 
what is halaal?' or 'everything is haraam for you people!'" (par. 21). This is "materialism, an 
incessant pursuit for [sic] material satisfaction that only considers the temporary world as 
the ultimate material end in itself", rejecting "the reality of the transcendental order, arguing 
for material fulfilment as the exclusive prerequisite for human fulfilment" (2004e: par. 12). 
"Weddings like so many other events, has [sic] become a purely commercialised occasion" 
(2004a: par. 4). Capitalism "views all lifes [sic] affairs from a superficial stand-point. It is to 
be expected, therefore the Capitalists' view of society is also superficial. They consider 
society to be merely a group of individuals" (2004k: par. 4). 
 The "collaborating and treacherous" governments of the Middle East, as Abu Salma 
Al-Hijazi (in MEMRI, 2003j: par. 6), an al-Qaeda commander close to bin Laden, calls 
them in an interview posted in the Internet forum Al-Qal'a (MEMRI, 2003j: par. 2), attempt 
"to lead" the region through "secularization" "to moral collapse, in accordance with the 
dictates of the White House", holds Abu Hajjer (in MEMRI, 2003h: par. 30), identified as 
one of Saudi Arabia's most wanted terrorists and quoted from an interview in The Voice of 
Jihad (MEMRI, 2003h: par. 2). "[I]t is generally agreed that they are powerless", states bin 
Laden (in MEMRI, 2003c: par. 41) in a sermon published on Islamist websites and 
broadcast on Al-Jazeera (MEMRI, 2003c: par. 2). 
The rulers of the Muslim lands today are a gang of apostates [and] criminals, the most 
evil creatures created on the face of the earth, whose crimes are known to all, and they 
are a paradigm of treachery, deceit, misleading, and repression. How many 
commitments have they given their people, only to then fill their graveyards and prisons 
with them? ... They have shed blood and violated the religious prohibitions. They have 
wasted the property of the Muslims on forbidden things. All that interested them was 
their bellies and their enslavement to the West (Nabil Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 
10). 
Sahrawi, a leader of the Algerian "Salafi Group for Da'wa and Fighting", gave an interview 
to Al-Hayat that, prior to publication, was also posted on Islamist websites (MEMRI, 2004c: 
par. 2). "Anyone who examines the policy of those rulers will easily see that they follow 
their whims and desires and their personal interests and Crusader loyalties" (bin Laden in 
Why War?, 2004: par. 62), referring to the "US-led Crusader Zionist alliance" (par. 23), 
another historical comparison popular among the terrorists. "Those hypocrites, 
worshippers of money, claim that they are our leaders and will defend us" (par. 31), but 
they act "tyrannically, erring [themselves] and leading others into flagrant error" (bin Laden 
in MEMRI, 2003c: par. 45). "These rulers have violated" Islam 
by allying themselves with unbelievers, by passing man-made laws and by approving 
and applying the infidel laws of the UN. As far as religious law is concerned, their rule 
has long been null and void, and it is impossible to remain under their dominion (par. 
42). 
"They have replaced Shari'a law, and they rule Muslims with the laws of Europe and 
America" (Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 10). "Allah is Al-Hakam (the legislator) but they 
insist on playing the role of Allah" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004l: par. 43) by "embracing 
democracy, by legislating it and calling for it" (par. 36). They "use parliaments and 
democracy as a cover" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2004: par. 65) and "rule Muslim countries 
by way of the cursed laws [i. e. man-made law]", according to Sheikh Nasser Al-Najdi's (in 
MEMRI, 2003h: par. 12) article in The Voice of Jihad (MEMRI, 2003h: par. 10). "All their 
constitutions ... declare sovereignty for" man-made law "rather than to Allah [sic]" (Al 
Muhajiroun, 2004l: par. 46). "It has become clear that the rulers are not qualified to apply 
the religion and defend the Muslims" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2004: par. 62) because they 
believe in the principle of supporting the infidels against Muslims and leave the blood, 
honor, and property of their brothers to be easy prey for their enemy in order to remain 
safe, claiming that they love their brothers but are being forced to take such a path 
(par. 44). 
"Because of this despicable cooperation, the prisons" in many Arab countries, but 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, 
have become full of prisoners, held on charges of fighting with al-Qa'ida and Taliban 
against the United States or fighting with Khattab, and recently on charges of 
attempting to infiltrate into Iraq to fight there. The shari'ah duty imposed on all the 
nation has become a punishable crime. They are doing all this to please the United 
States (CISR, 2003: par. 39). 
"This situation prevents us from following educational, economical [sic], social, judicial and 
foreign policies in accordance with Islam", claims Al Muhajiroun (2004k: par. 3). The rulers 
"ridicule Allah, his messenger", Muhammad, and "the Muslims" and have therefore 
become infidels themselves (2004l: par. 9). 
 
3.4  American and Israeli atrocities 
 
The terrorists refuse "everything" the United States offer "in the name of democracy, 
human rights, education, and the war on terror. ... It is proven that they [i. e. the 
Americans] bring with them nothing but tyranny", says Othman 'Akef (in MEMRI, 2004e: 
par. 15) in the Saudi daily Al-Watan (MEMRI, 2004e: par. 14). "American tyranny" 
(Othman 'Akef in MEMRI, 2004e: par. 17); "US tyranny" (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 206); "its 
tyranny" (al-Qurashi in MEMRI, 2002b: par. 3) is another keynote in the terrorists' thinking. 
"America, Oh sword of oppression, arrogance and sin", exclaims Dr 'Atallah Abu Al-Subh 
(in MEMRI, 2001: par. 4) in a letter "To America", published by the Hamas weekly Al-
Risala (MEMRI, 2001: par. 2). 
The sufferings of your Muslim brothers and of the Mujahideen around the world is no 
secret to you, our brothers. [They suffer] oppression, tyranny, imprisonment, murder, 
and banishment by the masters of oppressions and lies in the world, the American 
rulers, who think [of] themselves as good-doers (Islamic Bayan Movement in MEMRI, 
2003i: par. 6), 
states a communiqué that appeared on the al-Qaeda-affiliated website Al-Faroq and in the 
Yahoo newsgroup "Global Islamic Media" (MEMRI, 2003i: par. 2-3). 
 "Some have the impression that you", the Americans, 
are a reasonable people. But the majority of you are vulgar and without sound ethics or 
good manners. You elect the evil from among you, the greatest liars and the least 
decent and you are enslaved by your richest and the most influential among you, 
especially the Jews, who lead you using the lie of democracy (bin Laden in Al-Jazeera, 
2003b: par. 4). 
Bin Laden's message to the American people was broadcast on Al-Jazeera (Al-Jazeera, 
2003b: par. 1). "[T]he infidel United States ... [w]ith its policies ... sets itself up as a rival to 
God in His magnificence, greatness, rule, and law" (al-Ansari, 2002: par. 234), using its 
strength and power not to actualize justice and equality for the oppressed, but to 
besiege the[se] peoples, murder them, and spill their blood. It did not follow any law, 
unless the law was passed to strengthen its hegemony and its power (Dr Ghazi Hamad 
in MEMRI, 2001: par. 18), 
wrote the editor of Al-Risala in a column (MEMRI, 2001: par. 17-18). 
 "Due to the American bombings" (Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par 17), the ongoing 
"violent airstrikes on Iraq", as elaborates bin Laden (in Why War?, 2001: par. 21) in a 
recorded statement broadcast on Al-Jazeera (Why War?, 2001: par. 4), and "the West's 
barbaric savagery, namely, sanctions" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 26), "an unjust 
embargo, a slow killing operation" (al-Ansari, 2002: par. 45), the 
siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000 Muslims were killed in the past decade. Due to the 
siege, over a million children are killed [annually] – that is 83,333 children on average 
per month, 2,777 children on average per day (Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par. 17; 
see also Bergen, 2001: 22), 
who "starve to death" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 26) in an "engineered ... genocide ... The 
United States imposed an embargo on Afghanistan that killed more than 500,000 people" 
(al-Ansari, 2002: par. 45-46). "Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were slaughtered by the 
infidels", holds al-Qaeda leader Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi (in MEMRI, 2004b: par. 10) in an 
audio recording posted in Islamist Internet fora (MEMRI, 2004b: par. 2), namely "in 
Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan" 
(Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par. 33) as well as "Indonesia, Kosovo, ... Libya". "The 
United States killed Muslims ... using all varieties of internationally banned weapons 
against them. ... Its hands are dripping with the blood of all Muslim peoples" (al-Ansari, 
2002: par. 45-46). The Islamic "nation of 1,200 million Muslims is being butchered from 
east to west every day" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2001: par. 40). 
[D]on't you see the Muslims being killed in Afghanistan and in Iraq?! Don't you see, on 
the television screens, the bereaved women crying out for the Muslims' help?! Don't 
you see the torn parts of children, and their skulls and brains scattered...? (Voice of 
Jihad editorial board in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 31) 
The terrorists also continually confound Israel and America. "It suffices to see the event 
that shocked the world – the" assassination "of the wheelchair-bound old man", Hamas 
founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin by Israel, "– Allah's mercy upon him – and we pledge to 
Allah to avenge [his murder] on America, Allah willing" (bin Laden in MEMRI, 2004g: par. 
6). "Israel perpetrates terrorism, with funding and military and diplomatic support from the 
U.S.", said Taj Al-Din Hamed Abdallah Al-Hilali (in MEMRI, 2004f: par. 15), the Egypt-born 
Mufti of Australia and New Zealand (MEMRI, 2004f: par. 2), in an interview (par. 15). The 
United States "support the Israelis and their schemes" (bin Laden in Al-Jazeera, 2003b: 
par. 4) and "Israel's daily ongoing aggression against the Palestinian people", according to 
Othman 'Akef (in MEMRI, 2004e: par. 13), in the Jordanian weekly Al-Sabil (MEMRI, 
2004e: par. 13). 
 The wars in the Middle East bring "billions of dollars in profit" (bin Laden in BBC, 
2004: par. 22) to the "big corporations, either weapons manufacturers" (bin Laden in 
MEMRI, 2004g: par. 12) "or those that contribute to reconstruction" (bin Laden in BBC, 
2004: par. 22). Bin Laden criticizes corporations along the same lines as does the anti-
/alter-globalization movement. Multinational corporations "are directly responsible for 
starving and impoverishing people and exploiting the natural wealth of the oppressed" (al-
Ansari, 2002: par. 49). "It is crystal clear who benefits from igniting the fire of this war and 
this bloodshed: They are the merchants of war, the bloodsuckers who run the policy of the 
world from behind the scenes" (bin Laden in MEMRI, 2004g: par. 13). 
And to the American soldiers ... I say, ... [i]t shows that you are selling your lives for the 
lives of others. And you are spilling your blood to swell the bank accounts of the White 
House gang and their fellow arms dealers and the proprietors of great companies (bin 
Laden in Al-Jazeera, 2003b: par. 22-23). 
The American leaders "enjoy lying, war and looting to serve their own ambitions. ... They 
have fooled you ... and they have lied to you and the whole world" (par. 10). They are 
"concealing" their own "ambitions and the ambitions of the Zionist lobby and their own 
desire for oil", but are "still following the mentality of" their "ancestors who killed the Native 
Americans to take their land and wealth" (par. 8). 
Have you asked yourself about your actions against your 'original' inhabitants, the 
Indians, the Apaches? Your white feet crushed them, and then used their name, 
Apache, for a helicopter bearing death, demolition, and destruction for anyone with 
rights, who dared to whisper in his own ear that he has those rights? This is loathsome 
and malignant behavior, because it made us hate the Apache Indians, without realizing 
that they actually were victims like us (Abu Al-Subh in MEMRI, 2001: par. 4). 
The American leaders, "with their heavy sticks and hard hearts, are an evil to all 
humankind" (bin Laden in Al-Jazeera, 2003b: par. 7). "The blood of the children of Vietnam 
... is still dripping from their teeth" (par. 10). "They have stabbed into the truth, until they 
have killed it altogether in the eyes of the world. ... [T]hey have encouraged hypocrisy, and 
spread vice and political bribes shamelessly at the level of heads of state" (par. 7-8). The 
United States, "the leader of the free world and the symbol of the liberal democracy that 
some madmen still worship" (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 275), "with the collaboration of the Jews, 
is the leader of corruption and the breakdown [of values], whether moral, ideological, 
political, or economic corruption" (Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par. 14). 
 
3.5  Jihad: theology is politics 
 
The "salient reality" is 
that Islam is an inherently political doctrine. ... It is spiritual for the obvious reason that it 
is firmly rooted in the belief in Allah, but of equal political significance because Allah 
alone is the sovereign law maker. Politics is therefore not part of Islam, for this denotes 
that in origin it is a distinctly separate sphere of existence which is then eventually 
amalgamated with Islam; politics is the inherent core of the Islamic imperative of Allah's 
sovereignty – Islam thus cannot be described except in political terms. ... Islam is not a 
religion that is struggling to synthesise itself with the supposedly different domain of 
politics, it is a way of life that is inherently and quintessentially political (Al Muhajiroun, 
2004e: par. 16). 
Thus, says Attiya Allah, al-Qaeda does not have a 
political program compatible with the existing world order, simply because the existing 
world order does not recognize us as an independent Islamic state, and forces us to be 
its satellite, to adapt ourselves to its secular laws and to be subjugated to its military 
rule (in MEMRI, 2003k: par. 32). 
According to al-Hilali, "[a]l-Qa'ida laid the foundation for a new political line and new 
political concepts for the global arena". 
Every objective political thinker must note the historic fact that al-Qa'ida under the 
leadership of Imam Bin Ladin rescued the oppressed and downtrodden from the state 
of impotence, stagnation, confusion, and contradiction that had gripped them as 
various political bodies slowed, sickened, and died yet remained unburied (2002: par. 
267). 
"Islam stands against the domination of man by man – a problem that continues to 
relentlessly inflict the modern world", be it "in the form of ... economic exploitation" or 
"political oppression" – including "religious persecution". "Islam thus stands for the 
liberation of human beings by the guidance and mercy of Allah" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: 
par. 9). 
 According to bin Laden, "Jihad is the way to attain truth and abolish falsehood" (in 
MEMRI, 2003f: par. 33). "We are now engaged in Jihad between the armies of faith, truth, 
and goodness as opposed to the armies of unbelief, falsehood, and evil", seconds Abu 
Abd Al-Rahman Al-Turkemani (in Carmon, 2003: par. 23) on the "Global Islamic Media" 
website (Carmon, 2003: par. 21). "The Jihad is not dependent on the Al-Qaida 
organization nor on Osama bin Laden or anyone else but rather it is a cause of the whole 
Ummah, and a battle between truth and falsehood!" (Abu Ghaith in Why War?, 2002: par. 
35) 
Allah has imposed the obligation of Jihad in [several] cases, all of which exist in this 
generation: starting from repelling the aggression of the infidels, through fighting the 
apostates, supporting the oppressed, and liberating captives and prisoners (Al-Dosari 
in MEMRI, 2003g: par. 4). 
"The entire world has become a battlefield in practice and not in theory" (CISR, 2003: par. 
175). "The Islamic State will not arise through means of slogans, demonstrations, parties, 
and elections, but through blood, body parts, and [sacrifice of] lives" (Sahrawi in MEMRI, 
2004c: par. 23).  
The various forms and types of jihad are the true and ideal means of political 
participation in light of globalization/Americanization because real political participation 
consists of material action and tangible behavior, not just intentions and feelings. A 
strike against the economy affects politics (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 280). 
"Even if religion did not urge us to fight the United States", its "crimes against the Muslims" 
"are sufficient to move us to seek justice. Even if religion and manhood did not demand it, 
logic and a rational view of the situation demands that we deter the enemy as much as 
possible" (CISR, 2003: par. 73). 
As everyone knows, political realism entails an awareness of reality without excessive 
optimism or pessimism, a knowledge [sic] of one's capabilities, the use of realistic 
methods, and an unwavering commitment to one's goals. There can be no excuses 
about weak resources or ability. Instead, one must strive to make the best possible use 
of one's abilities no matter how weak or humble they may be. This is what al-Qa'ida's 
mujahidin did. They stuck to their stated goal of striking the US enemy's institutions. 
They used realistic tools at their disposal like airplanes (al-Hilali, 2002: par. 283-284). 
Americans, "[w]e announce to you the immanent end of your pleasant lives", warns Abu 
Shibab Al-Qandahari (in MEMRI, 2002d: par. 9), the deputy moderator of the News about 
the Jihad and the Mujahideen forum of the Islamist website www.mojahedoon.net, in a 
communiqué posted there (MEMRI, 2002d: par. 2). "We do not recognize your agreement 
with the [Muslim] governments that have renounced their religion" (Al-Qandahari in 
MEMRI, 2002d: par. 7). "Leave our land and stop supporting the plundering Jews; return to 
your countries, otherwise the sword will be between us and you" (par. 5). 
What happened to America is something natural, an expected event for a country that 
uses terror, arrogant policy, and suppression against the nations and the peoples, and 
imposes a single method, thought, and way of life, as if the people of the entire world 
are clerks in its government offices and employed by its commercial companies and 
institutions (Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 2002c: par. 6). 
The Muslim Nation "is finally ... beginning to reject the notion of democracy/ capitalism 
ruling over us". It is "healing from the poison of freedom, democracy, capitalism, 
nationalism, and secular thought which the fangs of the imperialist" infidels "injected in our 
thinking", states Al Muhajiroun (2004f: par. 12). "It is an obligation that we dismantle and 
demolish the ... concepts and ideas" of the infidels "that cast a dark shadow over our lands 
today" (2004e: par. 32). 
The phenomenon of Muslims rejecting the Western concepts in exchange for Islam is 
not limited to the Muslim world. This historic event can be witnessed all around the 
world, even in the Western nations. This has greatly worried the policy makers in the 
West (2004f: par. 13). 
Al Muhajiroun, the London-based website, even claimed that "living among the" infidels, 
for example in Britain, "must be ONLY for the sake of carrying da'wah or for involvement in 
Jihad purposes" (2004j: par. 31; their capitals).  
Every day we grow weaker and weaker. Every day America attacks us in another 
country, so what is preferable? That we act now while our veins still pulse, or that we 
wait until we see an American solder [sic] arranging the worshipers' entrance into the 
mosque in Mecca...? (Yahyah bin Ali Al-Ghamdi in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 36). 
Al-Ghamdi wrote a study entitled "The Years of Deception" (MEMRI, 2004d: par. 33) that 
was published in The Voice of Jihad (par. 2). 
 "America, have you ever tasted the taste of horror, sorrow, and pain? This is the 
taste that has been our lot for so long. This is the taste that has filled our stomachs, torn 
our guts, and burned our skin" (Abu Al-Subh in MEMRI, 2001: par. 6). "People live in 
perpetual fear and paralyzing terror, awaiting death at any moment from a missile or shell 
which will destroy their homes, kill their sisters and bury their babies alive" (bin Laden in 
MEMRI, 2003c: par. 14). 
America, you planted in the hearts of all men and animals the seedling of hatred of you! 
You never considered that the day would come when the saplings would grow and put 
out your eyes, even if those eyes were placed at the top of the World Trade Center, 
among the clouds. Those saplings grew and spread and struck at the liver of the 
Pentagon, the biggest and most secure site on the planet. ... America, why did you 
evacuate the biggest building in the world, and I refer to the Sears Tower, as we, the 
weak, do every night in order to protect ourselves from your laser-eyed missiles? Are 
you as frightened as we are, Oh America? Do the giants fear and flee, as the 
oppressed do, Oh America? (Abu Al-Subh in MEMRI, 2001: par. 10-11) 
"What happened on 11 September is nothing but a reaction to the continuing injustice 
being done to our children" that "concerns the nation in its entirety. This is something that 
requires people to rise from their slumber and rush to find a solution to this disaster, which 
threatens mankind" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2001: par. 18). 
What use was your navy to you? What use were your intercontinental missiles and 
your nuclear power plants? What use was the fact that you had almost completely 
conquered space with satellites and AWCS planes. What use was NATO, and the 
world leadership that you hold in your hands? (Abu Al-Subh in MEMRI, 2001: par. 16) 
"The world is divided into two parts: the part of belief, and the part of unbelief and 
falsehood. There is no third part" (Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 19). "The conflict in the 
world today" (par. 21), "[t]he battle between us and the Americans", "is not a battle based 
on interests or personal differences but rather a battle between truth and falsehood" (Abu 
Gheith in Why War?, 2002: par. 6), "belief and unbelief" (Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 
21) "– it is a conflict between the good and evil. America represents the head of this 
falsehood and the body of this evil" (Abu Gheith in Why War?, 2002: par. 6). 
The war in Palestine, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Algeria, in Chechnya, and in the 
Philippines is one war. This is a war between the camp of Islam and the camp of the 
Cross, to which the Americans, Zionists, Jews, their apostate allies, and others belong 
(Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 21). 
"America is the head of this alliance and the worldwide Kufr [disbelief] today" (Abu Gheith 
in Why War?, 2002: par. 6). 
As for those who lie to people and say that we hate freedom and kill for the sake of 
killing – reality proves that we are the speakers of truth and they lie, because the killing 
of the Russians took place only after their invasion of Afghanistan and Chechnya; the 
killing of the Europeans took place only after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan; the 
killing of the Americans in the Battle of New York took place only after their support for 
the Jews in Palestine and their invasion of the Arabian Peninsula (bin Laden in MEMRI, 
2004g: par. 22). 
"Also, killing them in Somalia was after their invasion of it in Operation Restore Hope. We 
made them leave without hope, praise be to God" (bin Laden in BBC, 2004: par. 42). 
 "What happened on 11 September [2001] and 11 March [the Madrid train bombings] 
is your commodity that was returned to you" (par. 10). 
We hereby advise you … that your definition of us and of our actions as terrorism is 
nothing but a definition of yourselves by yourselves, since our reaction is of the same 
kind as your act. Our actions are a reaction to yours, which are destruction and killing 
of our people as is happening in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine (bin Laden in MEMRI, 
2004g: par. 5). 
"Which religion considers your killed ones innocent and our killed ones worthless? And 
which principle considers your blood real blood and our blood water?" (bin Laden in BBC, 
2004: par. 15). "It is known that security is a pressing necessity for all mankind. We do not 
agree that you should monopolise it only for yourselves" (par. 11). "Reciprocal treatment is 
fair and the one who starts injustice bears greater blame" (par. 15). 
According to the numbers ... of the lives lost from among the Muslims because of the 
Americans, directly or indirectly, we still are at the beginning of the way. The Americans 
have still not tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. ... We have not 
reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of 
them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of 
thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological 
weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims 
because of the [Americans'] chemical and biological weapons (Abu Gheith in MEMRI, 
2002c: par. 34). 
"What is said above is sufficient to cause the" Muslim 
to burn with desire for the blood of the infidel, to slaughter the enemy of Allah, and to 
cut him up into pieces. This is not strange at all. If a believer would not be willing to 
stand the sight of someone walking on the earth whom he had heard cursing his father 
or harming his honor, then how much more so when someone curses his God, Whom 
he loves more than the love he feels for his beloved. How [will he stand it] while Allah 
permits him [to kill the infidel] and he knows that killing this man, as far as Allah is 
concerned, is like killing a dog? (Al-Najdi in MEMRI, 2003g: par. 11) 
"Oh Allah, America came with its horses and knights to challenge Allah and his Messenger 
[Muhammad] … Oh Allah, rend the kingdom of Bush as you rent the kingdom of Caesar" 
(Al-Zarqawi in MEMRI, 2004b: par. 13). "Bush, the son of Bush, is a dog and the son of a 
dog; his blood is the blood of a dog; his bark is the bark of a dog; and he has all the traits 
of a dog except for loyalty. Thus, he is a hyena" (Al-Najdi in MEMRI, 2003g: par. 13). 
The truth is that I do not wish that Bush would be killed. I wish he would live to die a 
thousand times as he sees America collapses in front of his eyes. We want to kill him a 
thousand times every hour. We want the Americans to hang him and leave him 
dangling from their Statue of Liberty for being responsible for the destruction of their 
alleged civilization (al-Ablaj in Why War?, 2003a: par. 36). 
"God willing, the end of America is imminent" (bin Laden in Why War?, 2001: par. 35). 
 
3.6  One state under Allah: the Caliphate 
 
"In conclusion, Unity is what we must strive for: not on the basis of it being  desirable, 
rather, on the basis of it being an Islamic Obligation defined clearly by Allah ... and His 
Messenger Muhammad" (Al Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 32). 
Therefore, the general aim of the Jihad and the Mujahideen is to strike at the 
foundations and infrastructure of the Western colonialist program or at the so-called 
world order – or, to put it bluntly, to defeat Crusaders in the battle that has been going 
on for over a century. Their defeat means, simply, the elimination of all forms of nation-
states, such that all that remains is the natural existence familiar to Islam – the regional 
entity under the great Islamic state (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2003k: par. 36). 
"It is ... obligatory upon us to tear down the imaginary political borders and boundaries 
currently dividing" the Muslim Nation. "[I]t is an absolute necessity that we strive 
continuously to unite the Muslim Lands as One Land under the Khalifah State" (Al 
Muhajiroun, 2004e: par. 32). 
The world order must be removed from the region and defeated, first of all militarily. 
Then, the Islamic state must be reestablished, in accordance with the Islamic regime. 
This means that we will control our fate, rule over ourselves, and control our resources. 
More generally, we will rebuild our lives according to our foundations and our 
principles. The experience [of an Islamic state] is real, and it existed 1,300 years ago. 
The peoples of the East ruled themselves and lived according to their own rules long 
before the West was in the region. There is nothing to prevent the revival of these 
rules, which are based on the Koran and the Sunna (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2003k: par. 
33). 
"The goal of" what the Americans "falsely called a war on terror, is to prevent the Muslims 
from establishing an Islamic state whose regime will be in accordance with the Qur'an and 
the Sunna of the Prophet" (Sahrawi in MEMRI, 2004c: par. 22). "Covert and open Islamic 
groups have been trying for decades to establish the Islamic state". "Jihad for the sake of 
Allah has managed to establish blessed states and entities that defended the Muslims and 
succeeded in applying Islamic Shari'ah law for certain periods", for example in Afghanistan 
or Chechnya. "Yesterday, we did not dream of a state; today we established states and 
they fall. Tomorrow, Allah willing, a state will arise and will not fall" (Al-Ghamdi in MEMRI, 
2004d: par. 39). 
No political program has a chance of succeeding if we do not defeat the West, militarily 
and culturally, and remove it from Muslim countries. Then, it will not be difficult for the 
nation, with the help of its tremendous resources, to rebuild life according to religious 
Islamic principles. We will become the masters of the world, as the world's economic 
fate depends on us because we have the resources the world needs and all the 
elements of controlling the world are in our hands (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2003k: par. 
34). 
But, then, quite contradictory: "What we are lacking is to live free and to rule ourselves by 
ourselves, cut off from the West and its agents" (par. 34). 
 Bin Laden asks the "honest people" among the Muslims "who are concerned about 
this situation, such as the ulema, leaders who are obeyed among their people" (in Why 
War?, 2004: par. 72), "preachers and merchants" (bin Laden in BBC, 2004: par. 28) to "get 
together and meet in a safe place away from the shadow of" the "suppressive regimes" of 
the Middle East 
and form a council for Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd (reference to honest, wise, and righteous 
people who can appoint or remove a ruler in Islamic tradition) to fill the vacuum caused 
by the religious invalidation of these regimes and their mental deficiency (bin Laden in 
Why War?, 2004: par. 72). 
This "Authoritative Council" (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 15) 
should be made up of the minimum number of available personnel, who should be 
tough on the rest of the nation, except what the religion allows in case of necessity, 
until the number is increased when the situation improves, God willing (bin Laden in 
Why War?, 2004: par. 73). 
The council "will crown an Imam from among the Muslims who will manage the affairs of 
the direct confrontation with the Crusaders" (Attiya Allah in MEMRI, 2004d: par. 15). The 
Americans "will not enjoy our wealth and land as long as we remain mujahid Muslims", 
promises bin Laden (in Why War?, 2004: par. 10), and we "will defeat the Zionist Jewish 
invaders [and] return them to the place from whence they came", threatens Abu Banan (in 
MEMRI, 2002d: par. 19), announcing the establishment of an al-Qaeda organization in 
Palestine (MEMRI, 2002d: par. 18) in the News about the Jihad and the Mujahideen forum 
(par. 2). "All that the Jews have built in Palestine will, God willing, be a booty for our 
Palestinian people, including Haifa, Yafo, Sidon, Ashqelon, and all these places" (al-Ablaj 
in Why War?, 2003a: par. 16). 
 Another aim of the Authoritative Council would be "to enlighten European peoples of 
the justice of our causes, above all Palestine". Its members "can make use of the huge 
potential of the media" (bin Laden in BBC, 2004: par. 28). 
Lastly, we should tell the world that Islam is a mercy from Allah ... which is desperately 
needed today. It is the only solution to the problems of this chaotic world. The only 
reason the policy makers in the West are fighting against the return of Islam is because 
once people get a chance to live under the Islamic system, they will abandon the 
corrupt Democratic/ Capitalist ideology and embrace the mercy of Allah ... as did the 
people of North Africa, Spain, Indonesia, and other lands in the past (Al Muhajiroun, 
2004f: par. 28). 
"I have complete faith that Islam will invade Europe and America, because Islam has logic 
and a mission", says Othman 'Akef (in MEMRI, 2004e: par. 31) on the "Muslim 
Brotherhood" website (MEMRI, 2004e: par. 30). 
 In conclusion of this chapter we must note that the terrorists view the media 
(including the Internet) and the publicity they receive from it as one weapon in the ongoing 
jihad. On the one hand they think that they are being misrepresented by Western media. 
Even in the Middle East, 
[t]he heresy against Allah and His Prophet is being carried out before the eyes and 
ears of all in newspapers, television, radio, and symposiums, and none oppose it ... 
The nation has never been as damaged by a catastrophe like the one that damages 
them today. In the past, there was imperfection, but it was partial. Today, however, the 
imperfection touches the entire public because of the communications revolution and 
because the media enter every home (bin Laden in MEMRI, 2003f: par. 17-19). 
"The media all over the world are controlled by Zionist fingers, particularly the Western 
media" (Hamed Abdallah Al-Hilali in MEMRI, 2004f: par. 10), orchestrating "the 
psychological war on us that has continued to slander us before and after 11 September" 
(al-Ablaj in Why War?, 2003b: par. 23). 
 On the other hand, the terrorists pride themselves of manipulating the Western media 
machine: "The cameras of CNN and other Western media dinosaurs undertook the task of 
filming the raid and sowing fear in its aftermath" (al-Qirshi, 2002: par. 160).  
The Westerners' rage increased once it became clear to them that [Muslims] could use 
the same computers that they did without espousing the same values. Against all their 
assessments, [Islamic] culture cannot be shattered by technology (al-Qurashi in 
MEMRI, 2002b: par. 8). 
We must thus exercise care when dealing with terrorist statements on the Internet – and 
remain critical.  
 
 
CHAPTER  4:  THE  RESURGENCE  OF  POLITICAL  THEOLOGY 
 
4.1  On the relationship of political theology and liberation theology 
 
I will start off this chapter by reviewing secondary literature on Christian and Islamic 
political and liberation theologies and how they interlink and compare. I will then follow this 
up with a review of secondary literature on radical Islam and terrorism, trying further to 
establish whether radical Islam could rightly be called a political theology. Finally, I will 
explore the most recent writings on "political theology" emanating from (mainly leftist) 
theory circles in Europe and the US. 
 Few secondary sources concern themselves with the relation between political 
theology and liberation theology. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza proposes that political 
theology's "primary task is hermeneutical" in that it tries to elaborate "a new hermeneutic 
of the relationship between theory and praxis" (1975: 5). He goes on to calling this a 
"political hermeneutic" (13). While Dorothea Sölle prefers "the expressions 'political 
interpretation' or 'political hermeneutics'" over against "political theology" so as to avoid 
that the latter be falsely understood as providing "a theological solution to properly political 
and social questions" (Fiorenza, 1975: 14), Fiorenza argues that liberation theology, in its 
raised awareness of "the conflicts and antagonisms of the present societal structures" 
(24), provides the proper foundation of any political theology:  
the hermeneutical function of political theology can only be achieved when political 
theology becomes liberation theology. Similarly, the liberating function of liberation 
theology can only be effected when liberation theology also takes up a hermeneutical 
task (24). 
Alfredo Fierro, also seeking to discover the communalities of (German) political theology 
and (Latin American) liberation theology, thinks that the most obvious is that they are both 
"operating under the sign of Marx" (1977: 80). Philippe André-Vincent claims that liberation 
theology "carries the stamp 'made in Germany'" and has given "the theological utopias 
born in sad old Europe" a new lease of life, "grounded in the hope of a 'new earth'", in 
Latin America (1982: 192-193). So too, liberation theology's "political analysis came ready 
made from the hands of others": they chose the "'socialist option'" and applied a "Marxist 
hermeneutic of the Bible" (196). They labour under the impression, he says, that "[i]n the 
twentieth century, there are no oppressed persons within the socialist camp ... In this 
'camp', one finds only liberation" (200). Some liberation theologians "(influenced by 
Althusser) refer to Marxism simply as one (or the) social science", explains Michael Löwy 
(1996: 72). He points out that most liberation theologians reject aspects of Marxism, such 
as its "economistic tendency" (that may view "capitalist development" as a precondition for 
communism ultimately being able to arise), and they "replace the proletariat as the unique 
subject of emancipation by broader concepts" like "'the poor'" or "'the people'" (77). 
Moreover, since the inglorious end of the Soviet Union there is a marked trend "to de-
emphasize the relationship of liberationist Christianity to Marxism" (80).  
 According to Phillip Berryman, even the concept of "liberation" was provided for 
liberation theology by "the quasi-consensus of Latin American social theorists that basic 
structural change – liberation – is necessary" (1987: 93). "Paradoxically", James Schall 
wonders, "liberation thought again makes South America theoretically insignificant since it 
claims that the real fault is in the North" (1982: 64). He speaks of an "unacknowledged 
intellectual neo-colonialism", introduced to Latin America by the very liberation theologians 
who studied themselves "under Italian, French, Spanish and German – sometimes even 
North American – theologians" (17-18). There are also inconsistencies in their argument: 
"the very notion of the possibility of change forces the recognition that things can also be 
worse. Poverty in fact is worse in parts of Asia or Africa than in Latin America as a rule" 
(124). And: "All the sympathy for the poor is not designed to keep them that way. The 
often-encountered tradition in Christianity that, spiritually, poverty is much safer than 
riches, is not stressed" in liberation theology at all (37). The (yet again, Western) concept 
of "'justice'" has "largely replaced the older Christian idea of charity" (39). With regard to 
liberation theology's status as a political theology, 
[t]he point to emphasize, however, is that politics in this model has again taken on a 
religious enthusiasm and earnestness, a kind of divine assurance that it has been the 
effort of modern thought, including Christian thought, to deny to it. This will mean in 
practice dealing with political and economic questions as if they were directly religious 
ones (43). 
 
4.2  Islamic political and liberation theologies 
 
The South African, Farid Esack, argues that in his country's struggle against apartheid a 
form of "liberation theology" emerged, to varying degrees, amongst Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus, Jews, and adherents of "African Traditional Religion". It manifested itself "in the 
growing numbers of religious figures and organizations who confessed the sin of silence in 
the face of oppression, acquiescence in the face of exploitation and power in the face of 
want" in this deeply religious multifaith society (1997: 8). This cannot be attributed solely to 
the spread of Latin American liberation theology to other continents and cultures, though, 
since Esack says that he is "unaware of any of the progressive Islamists, including myself, 
having read any work on liberation theology during the 1980s". He and others were only 
vaguely familiar with it and knew little of its impact in Latin America and parts of Asia (18). 
Nevertheless, he now holds that "[t]he attitude of the progressive Islamists finds a 
resonance in Christian liberation theology in Latin America" (109). 
 Esack deplores traditional Islamic theology's "reduction of Islam to the formal rituals, 
themselves stripped of spiritual depth by the preponderance of legalities", just as much as 
the fact that modern Islamic theology "is located in and addresses itself to the secularity of 
the privileged world" (110). He bases what he calls an "Islamic theology of liberation" (83) 
on the Qur'anic principle that 
one arrives at correct beliefs (orthodoxy) through correct actions (orthopraxis) (29:69). 
The latter is the criterion by which the former is decided. In a society where injustice 
and poverty drive people to say 'Even God has left, no one cares anymore', orthopraxis 
really means activity which supports justice, i. e., liberative praxis (13). 
Liberation theology insists that the Muslim cannot be "surrounded by oppression, 
institutionalized or not, without searching for ways in which the Qur'an can be used against 
it. Neutrality or objectivity in such a context is, in fact, a sin". The Qur'an and awareness of 
"the struggles of all the prophets" (83) demand "comprehensive insurrection against 
oppression in all its manifestations" (106) – "including those of race, gender, class and 
religion" (83) – and "jihad", according to the Qur'an, is "the path to establishing justice and 
praxis as the way of experiencing and comprehending truth. Jihad, as praxis serving as a 
hermeneutical key, assumes that human life is essentially practical; theology follows" (107-
108; his italics). Jihad, then, is intended "to transform both oneself and society" (107). 
Islamic liberation theology is "participatory" (83) and pro-democratic (see, for example, 95-
96), complying with Allah's "preferential option" (110) for "'the people' in general" (193) and 
"the oppressed and marginalized" in particular (110) by actively involving those "whose 
socio-political liberation it seeks and whose personal liberation becomes real through their 
participation in this process" (83). In South Africa, Muslims "refused to distinguish between 
their commitment to Islam and their commitment to the liberation struggle. … Instead, faith 
and political solidarity were fused, without one being reduced to the other" (199).  
 Asghar Ali Engineer (1990), who published his book, Islam and liberation theology, in 
India, makes no reference to Christian liberation theology at all. He does however appear 
to be trying to embed concepts of Latin American liberation theology in the context of the 
Qur'an ("a charter of liberation for the oppressed": 1990: 36), often using the same terms 
the Latin Americans use (although, as we saw, they borrowed them from elsewhere too). 
His socio-political analysis is similar, nay identical, to that of Christian liberation theology 
and radical Islam – "negation of justice, oppression of the weak, suppression of legitimate 
aspirations of the common people, discrimination on grounds of colour, nationality or sex, 
concentration of wealth and political power" –, except that he is favourably inclined toward 
both democracy and socialism (7-8). "It is highly necessary to abolish the capitalist system 
based on exploitation of man by man ... Islam took shape as a powerful challenge to the 
rich traders of Mecca who headed the establishment" (6). He issues a call to stand up to 
"the domination of economy by the multinationals" on which "the West Asian rulers rely 
heavily". All these predicaments, he thinks, have contributed to the "rise of fundamentalist 
Islam" (106): 
Exploitative economic 'development' ... leads to Westernisation (in contradistinction to 
modernisation), permissiveness among a section of people (usually collaborating upper 
classes) and change-resisting conservatism among another section (usually the lower 
middle-classes) (106). 
Engineer holds that "[a]ny society which perpetuates exploitation of the weak and the 
oppressed cannot be termed as an Islamic society" (5). Like Jesus in Latin America, 
Muhammad is seen here as "liberator". Islam is inherently "praxis-oriented" and thus 
Islamic liberation theology "must ... wage jihad against all that perpetuates poverty" (7). 
"Without ... liberationist jihad, one's faith would remain incomplete" (8).  
 The same understanding of jihad is to be found in A. G. Noorani, also an Indian 
Muslim, who defines Islamic "liberation theology in its best form" (2002: 118) as 
a true jihad against alien rule fought by non-violent means along with compatriots. A 
jihad is yet to be fought out against ignorance, economic deprivation, social injustice, 
constitutional abuse and political wrongs. In this battle, the Muslim must not only 
accept, but seek the association of, all, irrespective of their faith. Above all, the Muslim 
must wage the Greater Jihad, the Jihad-e-Akbar, within himself and in his own society. 
For, as the Quran says: 'Verily never will God change the condition of a people until 
they change it themselves' (13:11) (118). 
Qamar-ul Huda, professor of theology at Boston College, more recently proposed an 
Islamic liberation theology significantly influenced by Sufi mysticism. Admitting that 
Christian "liberation theology was very influential" in his life, for him liberation theology "is a 
place where faith and reason mix and match", leading to the faithful becoming "more 
inclusive and pluralistic and tolerant, both in theological and in non-theological terms" 
(Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 2002: par. 41-42). What Ali Banuazizi, professor of 
psychology, also at Boston College, calls "'Revolutionary Radical Islam,'" no to be 
confused with radical Islam in the usual sense of the term, "espouses something like a 
liberation theology". Influenced "by Marxism and other Third World initiatives", its 
proponents promise "a more egalitarian, democratic society" (The Boisi Centre Report, 
2002: par. 3). Such movements cut "across the traditional Sunni/Shi'ite divide in Islam" 
(par. 5). 
 Manochehr Dorraj seeks out the "liberationist" element in radical Islam. He views "the 
development of liberation theology and Islamic fundamentalism" as caused by "socio-
economic dislocations" resulting from the "rapid and uneven processes of industrialization 
and urbanization taking place in the Third World" that catapult whole societies "from the 
religious and cultural world of the Middle Ages to the 20th century" (1999: 226). Radical 
Islam and Christian political theology have much in common, he says: 
Khomeini's radical reinterpretation of Islamic eschatology that the Muslims should not 
passively await the return of the twelfth Imam to restore justice, and Seyyed Qutb's ... 
emphasis on praxis find their parallel in Gustavo Gutierrez's liberation theology (230). 
They also both emerged as a challenge to "established religion" as well as "secular 
authority" (230) and speak the same language, being "strongly influenced by Third-
Worldist ideologies" (231). "The writings of Muslim fundamentalists abound with the 
revival, politicization and populist reinvigoration of the image of Prophet Muhammad, Imam 
Ali, the first Shi'ite Imam, and Imam Husayn, his martyred son", just as much as liberation 
theologians keep invoking Jesus and the prophets (232). 
 Daniel Philpott understands what he calls "radical Islamic revivalism" to occupy "only 
a small niche in the spectrum of Islamic views of political theology" and only "the most 
ardent proponents" of radical Islam "advocate a violent antidote" to what they identify as 
barbaric degeneration of "Islamic civilization" (2002: 84). Very reasonably, he proposes to 
view radical Islam as a "political theology" based on a "social critique that measures the 
distance between that theology and contemporary social conditions and prescribes action 
accordingly" (92-93). 
 Mahmoud Sadri designates, in a number of articles on the topic, various dissident 
positions in Iran as "political theology" (2002: par. 45). Political theology he defines "as a 
form of theology that concerns religious legitimacy or admissibility of government" (n. d.: 
footnote no. 4). Different from Dorraj, he sees such "political theology" in (scholarly) 
opposition to "the absolutist and totalitarian theology of the ruling clerical elites in the 
Islamic Republic" (2002: par. 47). Iranian "varieties of political theology ... complement 
each other" (par. 45), he argues, some engaging "with Western social and political 
philosophy and theology", others, "of indigenous Islamic and Shiite" origin, "reclaiming and 
reinterpreting its pluralistic and democratic elements and relying on the contested nature of 
knowledge it produces" (par. 48). In Iran, where the revolution led to a conservative 
theocratic government, political theologians are united by their "innovative discourses of 
secularism" (n. d.: par. 1). 
 Other (less easily available) books include Hassan Hanafi's Islam, religious dialogue 
and liberation theology, and Islam and reconciliation of 1997 and Shabbir Akhtar's The 
final imperative: an Islamic theology of liberation of 1991. Tariq Ramadan deplores that 
few are aware of similar endeavours to interpret the Qur'an and Islamic values in a 
liberative way "in Indonesia and some parts of Africa, particularly in Maghreb and Egypt" 
(Paxchristi International, 2004: par. 45). The Spanish theologian, Juan José Tamayo, 
sums up that "the Christian liberation theology is more known and developed than the 
Muslim liberation theology, but this does not mean that the latter does not exist" (Paxchristi 
International, 2004: par. 9). 
 
 
 
4.3  On radical Islam 
 
4.3.1  Causes and extent of Islamic fundamentalism 
 
According to Bassam Tibi, "Islamic fundamentalism – or Islamism – should not be equated 
with Islam, but it would be an eyewash to deny the fact that political Islam is a major 
stream within contemporary Islamic civilization" (2003: ix). To validify the terrorists' claims 
and situate Islamist terrorism within Islam and the broader context of political and liberation 
theologies it will be worthwhile to review some of the recent secondary literature on Islam, 
terrorism and (non-) violence. 
 Lilla notes that Schmitt, in his book of 1950, The nomos of the Earth, "saw in the 
growing geographical ability of modern man to move and exert influence throughout the 
globe the cause of the simultaneous dissolution of sovereignty and the extension of 
enmity". In his Theory of the Partisan, 1963, "Schmitt further speculated that the rise of 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism was linked to this same historical process, as wars between 
nations gave way to civil wars or wars of national liberation waged by supranational 
networks of partisans" (Lilla, 1997: 40). Francis Fukuyama believes that religious 
fundamentalism – "[t]he revival of religion" at a time of near-universal dominance of 
capitalism and liberal democracy – "in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the 
impersonality and spiritual vacancy of liberal consumerist societies ... The emptiness of the 
core of liberalism is most certainly a defect in the ideology" (1989: 14). According to Dorraj, 
"postmodern religious fundamentalism is as much a revolt against the cultural and social 
dislocations of modernity as it is a way of adjusting to its dislocations" (1999: 235).  
Conditions in the World of Islam, particularly in its heartland, the Middle East, are by all 
accounts devastatingly desperate: economic crisis, ruthless dictatorships, 
delegitimization and decay of political rule, and a monumental crisis of meaning – all 
leading to dislocation, disruption, and violence (Tibi, 2003: 60). 
Students, who "had a traditional childhood upbringing", but were exposed "to the 
technological and cultural manifestations of the post-modern era" during their education 
"constitute the most vulnerable social bearers of the glaring contradictions of modernity" 
and are therefore the most fertile "base of support for the fundamentalists" (Dorraj, 1999: 
235; on the social upheavals brought about by "globalization", see Ahmed, 2003: 51-52, 
and Lewis, 2003: 87, 91). Samuel Huntington sees more generally "the new middle class" 
of young urban "people who ... pursue careers in the professions, government, and 
commerce" as the bearers of "the religious revival" (1996: 101; see also 112-113, and Tibi, 
2003: 33). "Their greater familiarity with the West makes their angst all the more 
formidable" (Tibi, 2003: 78). In addition, "through the universality of the modern media, ... 
inequalities" have become "painfully visible" (Lewis, 2003: 100). Radical Islam, says 
Manuel Castells, is but one instance of "the widespread surge of powerful expressions of 
collective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural 
singularity and people's control over their lives and environment", building "trenches of 
resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family, locality, that is, the fundamental 
categories of millennial existence now threatened under the combined, contradictory 
assault of techno-economic forces and transformative social movements. ... More often 
than not" movements of resistance, such as al-Qaeda, employ "new, powerful 
technological media, such as worldwide, interactive telecommunication networks, ... 
amplifying and sharpening their struggle" (2002: 2; on the use of ICTs by Islamist 
terrorists, see also, for example, Bergen, 2001: 20, and Juergensmeyer, 2003: 144). Al-
Qaeda "is as much a creation of globalization as a response to it" (Bergen, 2001: 196). 
Thanks to the rapid development of the media, and especially of television, the more 
recent forms of terrorism are aimed not at specific and limited enemy objectives but at 
world opinion. Their primary purpose is not to defeat or even to weaken the enemy 
militarily but to gain publicity and to inspire fear – a psychological victory (Lewis, 2003: 
114). 
Peter Bergen likens radical Islam to "the Protestant Reformation's attempt to correct the 
abuses of the medieval Catholic Church and to return Christianity to its founding 
principles" (2001: 3; for an account of the so-called "Islamic Resurgence" since the 1970s, 
see Huntington: 1996: 111-116). Bin Laden is "the ideologue" and looked to "for guidance 
and inspiration" even by Muslims who are not part of al-Qaeda – "millions of admirers ... 
view him as a symbol of resistance to the West" (Bergen, 2001: 33). The Muslim countries' 
"radicalised population", "radical Islamists who see the world as a Manichaean struggle of 
believers and nonbelievers, ... are not ... a small and isolated group of fanatics" 
(Fukuyama, 2002: 6). "Muslim parents in their thousands are naming their sons Osama" 
(Ahmed, 2003: 29). Bin Laden's "ideas are influencing the beliefs and actions of militants 
from Yemen to Kenya to England" (Bergen, 2001: 37). "[T]he line is very thin between 
'terrorists' and their 'non-terrorist' supporters", says Juergensmeyer (2003: 8). Therefore, 
"Islamic fundamentalists are far more dangerous as ideologues of power than as 
extremists who ... throw bombs" (Tibi, 2003: xxvii). Mark Juergensmeyer views acts of 
terrorism as "symbolic statements aimed at providing a sense of empowerment to 
desperate communities" (2003: xi). Because "groups that have made a long-term impact ... 
have used violence not only to draw attention to themselves but also to articulate the 
concerns of those within their wider cultures", "they have not been marginal at all" within 
their communities (224). And Tibi adds: "the terrorists of New York and Washington were 
not a crazed gang, inasmuch as they represent an existing significant stream with 
numerous followers within Islamic civilization" (2003: xvi).   
 While possibly disapproving of violence themselves, many Muslims "who live within 
cultures of violence ... understand that often the violence that emerges from within their 
own ranks, though not morally justified, is a reaction to the experience of being oppressed 
and violated" (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 225). 
Like peoples in non-Western civilizations, Muslims suffer the concrete effects of 
disruption and dislocation, but unlike the others they have a worldview that entitles 
them to dominate. But to the contrary, they are dominated by others, to whom they feel 
– thanks to their divine revelation – superior. If this point is missed, Western observers 
will fail to grasp how Muslims feel about the current world order (Tibi, 2003: 61; the 
same view is expressed by Lewis, 2003: 16). 
In addition, many Muslims see the West's "War On Terror" as "a war against Islam" 
(Ahmed, 2003: 1). 
 
4.3.2  Secularism, democracy, and the nation-state 
 
Bergen confirms the terrorists' view that there is no distinction in Islam "between the 
secular and the sacred ... Indeed, Muhammad's success as a prophet was inextricably 
entwined with his role as a political and military leader" (2001: 97; but compare Tibi's claim 
opposing the historicity of "Allah's rule": 2003: 18-19, 77). According to Bernard Lewis, 
"[t]he Founder of Islam was his own Constantine, and founded his own state and empire ... 
The dichotomy of regnum and sacerdotium, so crucial in the history of Western 
Christendom" does not therefore exist in Islam (2003: 5; Lewis' italics). In the century 
following Muhammad's death, Islam conquered "a vast empire that stretched from the 
African coast of the North Atlantic to northern India. It is to this golden age of Islam that bin 
Laden harks back" (Bergen, 2001: 97; see also Huntington, 1996: 263; Lewis, 2003: 5-6; 
and Brown, 2000: 44-47). Muslims must strive "to achieve the divinely ordained political 
community in this world, the dunya", which includes both "din (religion)" and "dawla (state)" 
in a non-separated form, claims L. Carl Brown (2000: 1; his italics). They cannot "heed 
secular authority that would make religion a private concern" (141).  
Increasingly, Muslims attack the West not for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous 
religion, which is nonetheless a 'religion of the book,' but for not adhering to any 
religion at all. In Muslim eyes Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality 
are worse evils than the Western Christianity that produced them (Huntington, 1996: 
213). 
Modernity and secularism are "almost by definition corrupting to all religion", but "above all 
to ... Islam, which prefers that men render everything unto Allah, ecclesiastic and worldly, 
spiritual and temporal alike" (Barber, 1996: 210; on Islam and secularism, see also 
Juergensmeyer, 2003: 77, and Huntington, 1996: 70; on failed attempts since the 1830s to 
introduce "technical modernization without excessive cultural Westernization" to Muslim 
countries, see Huntington, 1996: 74, 114). Particularly "the institution of the nation-state 
denies Islam's claim to a universal Islamic order constructed along the lines of the 
shari'a/Islamic law" (Tibi, 2003: 38; his italics; on the concept of shari'a and legitimacy of 
government, see also 154, 165, and Lewis, 2003: 103). 
In the Arab world, existing states have legitimacy problems because they are for the 
most part the arbitrary, if not capricious, products of European imperialism, and their 
boundaries often did not even coincide with those of ethnic groups such as Berbers 
and Kurds. These states divided the Arab nation, but a Pan-Arab state, on the other 
hand, has never materialized. In addition, the idea of sovereign nation states is 
incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the ummah. As a 
revolutionary movement, Islamist fundamentalism rejects the nation state in favor of the 
unity of Islam (Huntington, 1996: 175; his italics). 
While "the monotheism of Islam does not allow for a division between the world and the 
spirit – for it does not recognize that duality – it does allow for a struggle against duality 
itself", it was argued by Banisadr, an associate of Khomeini's (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 157). 
Radical Islam is therefore "a powerful challenge to the existing order of the international 
system of secular nation-states" (Tibi, 2003: 3). 
 This problem was further aggravated because "[t]he West, and especially the United 
States, which has always been a missionary nation", was strengthened by the collapse of 
communism in its belief "that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally 
and hence was universally valid" and that it was justified to continue spreading "the 
Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights, 
individualism, the rule of law", often against the wishes of the majority of the population, to 
Muslim countries. "The West is attempting and will continue to attempt to sustain its 
preeminent position and defend its interests by defining those interests as the interests of 
the 'world community.'" Muslims cannot but identify this Western "universalism" as a new 
form of "imperialism" (Huntington, 1996: 183-184; Tibi, 2003: 61-62, 65, confirms this view, 
as does Lewis, 2003: 42-43; Huntington reminds us however that Islam seems to get just 
as easily in conflict with non-Western "civilizations", namely its "Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist" 
neighbours: "In the early 1990s ... two-thirds to three-quarters of intercivilizational wars 
were between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its 
innards": Huntington, 1996: 255-258, 264; his italics; see also Ahmed, 2003: 7). 
 Bergen thinks that that "[t]here is nothing inherently 'antidemocratic' in Islam, and 
there are Muslim concepts, such as shura – 'consultation with the people' – that fit rather 
neatly into a democratic framework" (2001: 226; his italics). Tibi however argues that it is 
rather a question of "shura/consultation versus secular democracy" (2003: 138; his italics). 
Moderates insist that the sovereignty of Allah's will "still leaves ample room for the majority 
to exercise political authority as long as it does so within a framework that acknowledges 
the ultimate hegemony of divine power" (Barber, 1996: 209; see also Tibi, 2003: 26). 
Just as Franco's fascism, seventeenth-century Europe's divine right of kings, and 
America's 1960s civil rights movement all emerged from Christian societies, any 
number of political models is possible in an Islamic environment. The proof lies in 
Indonesia: With more than two hundred million inhabitants, it is one of the world's 
largest democracies and the world's largest Muslim country (Bergen, 2001: 227). 
As another successful example, in Africa, one might mention Senegal – a smaller Muslim 
country with a long-standing democratic tradition. Benjamin Barber observes however the 
fact that Islam "has less room for secularism than any other major world religion" (1996: 
206) and holds that 
[a]n empirical survey of existing governments in Islamic nations certainly affirms a 
certain lack of affinity between Islam and democracy. In nearly all Muslim nations, 
democracy has never been tried or has been pushed aside after unsuccessful 
experiments (207; see also Huntington, 1996: 113). 
Huntington claims that "Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to 
emerge in much of the Muslim world" (1996: 29), while Barber proposes to look back to 
"ancient antecedents" of democracy which "in its premodern and preliberal forms is not 
necessarily at odds ... with fundamentalist Islam" (1996: 209). Tibi explains that not all 
fundamentalists approve of the use of violence – which does however not equate to being 
sympathetic to "'democratization.'" (2003: xxiii). 
 
4.3.3  History and ideological roots of jihad 
 
Juergensmeyer offers a discussion of various notions of the use of violence in Islam (2003: 
80-83). His view of there being a strong tradition of non-violence is being contradicted by 
Huntington though (1996: 263). Juergensmeyer argues that it is only a recent 
phenomenon "that the approval of force for the defense of Islam can be expanded to 
include struggles against political and social injustice" and claims that Abd al-Salam Faraj, 
the Egyptian author of a pamphlet, Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah (The neglected duty; 
Juergensmeyer's translation) – "a remarkably cogent argument for waging war against the 
political enemies of Islam" that was first published in Cairo in the early 1980s –, may have 
"had greater influence in ... reinterpreting the traditional Muslim idea of struggle – jihad –" 
than any other thinker. Jihad is "the 'duty' that has been profoundly 'neglected'" by being 
interpreted allegorically rather than taken literally. "The true soldier of Islam is allowed to 
use virtually any means available to achieve a just goal" (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 82). Most 
importantly, Faraj was only the last to write "in a tradition of radical Islamic political writers 
reaching back to the beginning of this century and before" (83). Noorani, referring to bin 
Laden, claims that "there was not a spark of originality ... in the ideas he put forth" (2002: 
8). Ayatollah Khomeini, for instance, the author of a 1970 book-form collection of lectures 
on Islamic government (Lewis, 2003: 64; Brown, 2000: 170), already "remarked that "Islam 
is politics or it is nothing" (Lewis, 2003: 6). Sayyid Qutb, a leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was executed in 1966 (Tibi, 2003: 34) after writing prolifically throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, including a "six-volume Qur'anic commentary" (Brown, 2000: 156). His 
most powerful accusation ... is the degeneracy and debauchery of the American way of 
life, and the threat that it offers to Islam. This threat ... became a regular part of the 
vocabulary and ideology of Islamic fundamentalists, and most notably, in the language 
of the Iranian Revolution. This is what is meant by the term the Great Satan, applied to 
the United States by ... Khomeini. Satan as depicted in the Qur'an is neither an 
imperialist nor an exploiter. He is a seducer, 'an insidious tempter who whispers in the 
hearts of men' (Qur'an CXIV, 4, 5) (Lewis, 2003: 61). 
Tibi traces what he calls "neo-jihad" (2003: xv; his italics; for a discussion of more 
traditional forms of missionary jihad as "exertion" rather than "holy war", see 54-55) – that 
is, "an irregular war" – back to Hassan al-Banna, founder, in 1928, of the already 
"fundamentalist" Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and his essay, Risalat al-Jihad (Essay on 
jihad; Tibi's translation), published in the first part of the twentieth century (xvi, 52-53). Al-
Banna is said to have "envisaged an Islamic utopia with no political parties, no class 
antagonism, and no legitimate differences of personal or group interests: the Islamist 
equivalent of the utopian Marxist classless society" (Brown, 2000: 146). "Al-Banna 
accepted nationalism but only as a part of God's greater community – the umma" (148; his 
italics). Still earlier, the "Pan-Islam" "movement that appealed to Muslims and caused 
concern to the West from roughly the 1870s until the First World War … prefigured the 
internationalized political Islam characterizing today's world" (107). Some of "the most 
basic readings of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism" are the writings of the medieval 
"Muslim jurist Ibn Taimiyya" who "dismisses 'human rule' as ta'til, the suspension of God's 
rule" (Tibi, 2003: 38; Tibi's italics). Taimiyya's name is no longer known only to specialists 
as his ideas "appeared in the popular media" (Brown, 2000: 122). 
 Lewis argues that "[t]he overwhelming majority of early authorities, citing the relevant 
passages in the Qur'an, the commentaries, and the traditions of the Prophet, discuss jihad 
in military terms" and only "modern Muslims, particularly when addressing the outside 
world, explain the duty of jihad in a spiritual and moral sense" (2003: 24). According to 
Huntington, "[t]he parallel concepts of 'jihad' and 'crusade' not only resemble each other 
but distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions" (1996: 211). "The 
presumption is that the duty of jihad will continue, interrupted only by truces, until all the 
world either adopts the Muslim faith or submits to Muslim rule" (Lewis, 2003: 25). The first, 
successful, jihad against an occupying foreign power, based "on Islamic principles", was 
waged against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Huntington, 1996: 246). That war 
left behind ... a legacy of expert and experienced fighters, camps, training grounds, and 
logistical facilities, elaborate trans-Islam networks of personal and organizational 
relationships, a substantial amount of military equipment ... and, most important, a 
heady sense of power and self-confidence over what had been achieved and a driving 
desire to move on to other victories (247; see also 273, 287). 
Some students of radical Islam claim that "[t]he new religious revival is not simply a revival 
of the old, ... the dynamics of religious revivalism must be understood against the ongoing 
dialectic of the modernization of tradition and the traditionalization of modernity" (Dorraj, 
1999: 235). Tibi holds that "fundamentalists invent the tradition of shari'a, as an Islamic 
constitution of the state. This is the interpretation of din wa dawla/unity of religion and 
state, which is a fundamentalist 'invention of tradition,' as Eric Hobsbawm puts it" (Tibi, 
2003: 165; his italics; on the fundamentalists Jarisha and Zaibaq's "play of language" with 
the term shari'a, "mixing old and new concepts, as well as introducing new meanings and 
simultaneously claiming both originality and authenticity", see 154). Also, fundamentalism 
dismisses "cultural modernity while embracing instrumental modernization" (66) and uses 
"the language of modernity to contest the evils of modernity" (68): 
In discussions I have had with Islamic fundamentalists I have at times been quite 
amazed to see them cite the postmodernist and cultural-relativist approaches posited in 
the West itself to sustain their conviction that modernity is on the verge of decay, and to 
support their neo-absolutist program (106). 
It may be that "some of the fundamentalists operate in an intellectually schizoid program", 
Tibi thinks (68). Bryan Turner proposes not to "regard Islamic fundamentalism as anti-
modern, because the implication of this opposition is to equate fundamentalism with 
traditionalism". Islamic fundamentalism has however been as "opposed to traditional 
religiosity, such as Sufi mysticism, as it has been to the corruption of western 
consumerism", criticizing traditional Islam "as a principal source of weakness in the face of 
modernization". Turner points out that "[t]here are sociological arguments in favour of 
regarding puritanical forms of ... fundamentalism – whether Christian or Islamic or Jewish 
– as sources of modernity in opposition to traditional patterns of spiritual mysticism" (2002: 
113). 
 Some scholars equally operate in an intellectually schizoid mode, it would appear. 
They find their intellectual judgement clouded by their personal dislike of radical Islam, but 
cannot abstain from discussing it. This statement by a Princeton Professor in Foreign 
Affairs Emeritus sums up the feeling: 
I am intellectually fascinated by establishment-challenging religious movements, of 
whatever religion, but they disturb me. To say that they are distasteful would be entirely 
too weak. I simply do not like those individuals, in past history or present times, who 
believe that God has given them a clear message of what is required and has also 
mandated that they employ any means necessary to impose that message on others. I 
would go so far as to insist that such arrogance (as I see it) offers a poor parody of 
Islam or, for that matter, of Judaism and Christianity. Given this prejudice, I have made 
a conscious effort to be fair to those religious radicals whose ideology and actions I 
deplore (Brown, 2000: 4-5). 
 
4.4  Slavoj Žižek and the new debate 
 
The most recent writings on Christian "political theology" emerged from rather unexpected 
quarters. Post-1989 and, with increased urgency, post-2001, political theology has 
become a concept of choice in (mainly leftist, post-Marxist) circles of social and political 
thought, cultural, legal and international relations theory, social and cultural criticism, and 
philosophy in Europe and the US (Lilla, 1997: 32, dates the left's interest in Schmitt back 
to the 1970s and attributes it to the influence of Taubes). From there it has begun to reflect 
back into the realm of theology once more. Surprisingly, the language of political theology 
appears to have changed from German to English. A number of topical publications, often 
multidisciplinary, have appeared over the past few years, most notably titles such as John 
McCormick's article Political theory and political theology: the second wave of Carl Schmitt 
in English, published in the journal Political Theory in 1998; and books such as Oliver 
O'Donovan's The desire of the nations: rediscovering the roots of political theology (1996); 
Sergii Bulgakov: towards a Russian political theology, edited by Rowan Williams (1999); in 
2003, Heinrich Meier's Das theologisch-politische Problem: zum Thema von Leo Strauss 
(English translation, Leo Strauss and the theologico-political problem, published in 2006); 
and Meier's bilingual Was ist politische Theologie? What is political theology? (2006); 
Religion and violence in a secular world: toward a new political theology, edited by Clayton 
Crockett (2006); and, also in 2006, Political theologies: public religion in a post-secular 
world, edited by Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan; Theology and the political: the new 
debate, edited by Creston Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek (2005); in 2004, by the 
same editors, Ontological politics: radical secular and religious thought; as well as, in 
2006, edited by Žižek together with Eric Santner and Kenneth Reinhard, The neighbor: 
three inquiries in political theology; and finally a paper, presented by Geoff Boucher at the 
2006 Australian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference, Misrecognising the 
neighbours as friends: against leftwing political theology. 
 Many of the most recent books are still hardly available outside their country of 
publication, the United States (there being, for example, no holding in any UK library, 
including the British Library). It may therefore be little known that a resurgence of 
(Christian, or at least Christian-inspired) "political theology" appears to be taking place in 
our time (quite possibly as a reaction to the more visible rise of Islamic political theology). 
The urgency and immediacy of this endeavour seems properly expressed by the fact that 
most of these publications are collections (joint efforts, carried and legitimated by a broad 
array of scholars and thinkers) rather than monographs. Often these writings read more 
like petitions – addressed to a higher authority the authors do not believe in anymore, but 
wish they could believe in (again), be this God or Marx – than manifestos. An uncertainty 
and confusion shines through that was not present in earlier political and liberation 
theologies, and is not present now in radical Islam. Differently from the new political 
theology of the 1960s and liberation theology, both of the Christian and Islamic 
persuasion, this latest political theology often acknowledges its indebtedness to Schmitt 
(for example, Žižek, 1999: 113-116), while Metz hardly finds mention and Christian 
liberation theology is cited seldom. Many authors seem particularly drawn to Schmitt's 
straight-forward friend/enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1996/32; see Schmitt, 1970: 22; 
remember Moltmann's critique, 1973: 67, afore mentioned). Most participants in the 
current English-language debate appear utterly ignorant of the preceding German debate 
and the decades of scholarship that sustained it. (The essay by Davis and Riches, 2005, 
for example, betrays, without making it explicit, the influence of liberation theology, much 
of which is available in English translation, while the German debate, that has not been 
rendered into English, is simply ignored.) 
 Theological strongholds of the new debate are the Centre of Theology and 
Philosophy, under the direction of Milbank, at the University of Nottingham, founded in 
2005, coinciding with the new interest in political theology, and the Chair of Philosophical 
Theology, formerly held by Milbank, at the University of Virginia, where Davis did his PhD. 
A 2002 conference at Virginia organised by Davis and attended, among many others, by 
Žižek, Williams, and Antonio Negri (who is said, although ailing, to be currently working on 
a book on Lenin and theology) appears to be a focal point for the development of much of 
the new debate. The book, Theology and the political: the new debate, resulted directly 
from that conference and many of the, often rather unlikely, participants of the conference 
and/or contributors to the book subsequently sustained an interest in political theology and 
are currently working on monographs. Some contributors or participants (not all 
contributors to the book participated in the conference and not all participants in the 
conference contributed to the book), such as Žižek, may of course have a history with 
political theology dating back slightly further, that previously had just not been coordinated 
with others. It is noticeable that many of the contributors to this and other books come from 
a philosophical (or ontological) rather than a theological angle, and such an interest is 
apparent even in the contributing theologians. A multidisciplinary 2007 symposium, "The 
Resurgence of Political Theology", organised by myself and the Sussex Centre for the 
Individual and Society (SCIS) and taking place at the University of Pisa, Italy, in 
September, attracted almost twenty papers on the subject of political theology as political 
theory and will include scholars from all five continents, among them Davis, Jürgen 
Manemann (a student of Metz') and Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl (the translators of 
Schmitt's Politische Theologie II, to be published in English in 2008). 
 The attempt by some to introduce earlier texts into the new debate has led to the 
belated translation or republication of books such as Politische Theologie II; Meier's Was 
ist politische Theologie? What is political theology?, an updated version of a German 1992 
publication; and Taubes' The political theology of Paul, published in 2004, but based on 
lectures given in 1987 (at Schmitt's urging: Reinhard, 2007: 1) and first published in 
German in 1993. Somewhat independently from and predating the political theology 
debate, Saint Paul found renewed reception in a number of theorists and philosophers 
such as Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, and again Žižek. The interest in Paul and the 
new debate on political theology are explicitly linked, for example, in Reinhard's paper, 
Paul and the political theology of the neighbor (2007). In this erudite piece Reinhard gives 
the impression to be arguing that in the concept of political theology the notion of "God" 
should be replaced with the notion of "neighbor" (as Paul arguably did, with regard to the 
commandments, in Romans 13, contradicting Jesus' call to love of God and neighbour). In 
a laborious argument, Reinhard employs the Bible, Taubes, Freud, Lacan, Benjamin, 
Badiou, Agamben, and many others to let them (apparently) make the point (on his behalf) 
that a "political theology of the neighbor" would "enact ... a profanation of the sacred, ... 
restore to common usage something that was previously sacrosanct" (2007: 28; his italics) 
– in effect, constitute a political theology without God, one might be led to think. 
Moreover, this is also to rescue neighbor-love from the banalization of secularization, 
where it functions at best as a platitude of ethical reason, the empty universal par 
excellence, or at worst as the ideological cloak for institutional indifference and social 
cruelty. The political theology of the neighbor would reappropriate a certain space, in 
order to open it for renewed use, as neighborhood (28; his italics). 
Once more secular Western political theology appears to be devising the most abstract 
arguments to elaborate points of social critique rather similar to those put simply by 
liberation theology both in Latin American Christianity and Islam. According to William 
Desmond, political theologians usually "do not do a good job in keeping before us the 
reminders of a higher measure that comes from the community of agapeic service" (2005: 
180-181). 
 A critique of this latest political theology can be made manifest at the example of 
Žižek who is its most vocal representative – a man who, as recently as 2000, opened a 
book with the statement that "[o]ne of the most deplorable aspects of the postmodern era 
and its so-called 'thought' is the return of the religious dimension in all its different guises" 
(2001: 1). The assumption of the mantle of "political theology" by Žižek and other 
contributors to the new debate may appear so "silly" (this at least is the word that springs 
to mind) and to make little sense because in the texts they produce so many different 
influences are being used in such an idiosyncratic (not to say "idiotic") manner. For 
example, Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction is part not of Politische Theologie, but of his 
later book, Der Begriff des Politischen (English translation: The concept of the political: 
1996/32). Differently from Žižek, Reinhard, and other contributors to the new debate, 
Schmitt did not use Bible quotes or references to popular culture to make his point. Paul is 
often being (mis-)used to construct pseudo-theological arguments that in the end only 
expose their authors' limited knowledge or grasp of (or care for) either theology or Paul. 
(Saint Paul has in Žižek the same value as the continuous references to films, books and 
jokes: providing a convenient prop for Žižek to engage in discussions only marginally 
related to Paul, Christianity, or religion. The new debate is in danger of treating "the 
Scriptures ... as a mine for random sociological analogies dug out from the ancient world", 
finds O'Donovan: 1996: 22. As Žižek is famed for being a pop philosopher, we can only 
hope that Paul will soon become unfashionable again.) Žižek in particular, in books like 
The ticklish subject (1999) and The puppet and the dwarf (2003), shows himself to be 
theologically naïve, falling (nay, jumping) into about every trap of "God-talk" that 
theologians learn to avoid. His brand of amateur theology – while quite possibly trying to 
convey the impression of talking about Christianity to non-Christians, or lapsed Christians 
– takes the Bible more literal than most trained theologians nowadays would. He does not 
reflect on the Bible or specific passages and their meaning as he undoubtedly would on 
any other text. Equally unreflective is his use of the very word "theology". 
 The new debate can rightfully be called the first truly postmodern engagement with 
political theology – with patchwork all too often replacing coherence. The attitude of many 
participants in this debate is crassly instrumental and areligious and consequently results 
in scholarship of questionable value. Often it may seem that for these writers, religion has 
merits only in so far as it can be placed in the genealogy of a particular philosophy or 
ontology. First, political and liberation theologians discovered Marxism and socialism for 
their aims, now former Marxists and socialists appear to have discovered Christianity as a 
replaceable means of argumentatively justifying their preformed beliefs. In Žižek's own 
words this reads: 
Following Alain Badiou's path-breaking book on Saint Paul, our premiss here is exactly 
the opposite one: instead of adopting such a defensive stance, allowing the enemy to 
define the terrain of the struggle, what one should do is to reverse the strategy by fully 
endorsing what one is accused of: yes, there is a direct lineage from Christianity to 
Marxism; yes, Christianity and Marxism should fight on the same side of the barricade 
against the onslaught of new spiritualisms – the authentic Christian legacy is much too 
precious to be left to fundamentalist freaks (2001: 2; his italics). 
Žižek calls this, not wholly original, "the subversive core of Christianity" (119; or, in the 
subtitle of his 2003 book: The perverse core of Christianity). As theologically shallow as 
much liberation theology may appear to be, it has still a lot more depth than the reverse 
attempt by atheistic Marxists to appropriate Christianity. 
 One may be tempted to interpret the "patricide" that Reinhard means to detect in 
Paul's omission of the commandment to love God, as transference from the political 
sphere. Postmodern post-Marxists are unlikely to spend much time "killing" God, God is 
always presumed dead already and to have been so for more than a hundred years. So 
why the emphasis on Paul and the omission of God in Romans 13? May we take a clue 
from the fact that Negri is writing a book on Lenin and theology, and Milbank refers to the 
"tragic subject" in Žižek's writings as "the new Lacanian-Leninist revolutionary" (who may 
visit violence upon those still adhering to outdated laws, or commandments) (Milbank, 
2005: 422)? Should we maybe read "Lenin" instead of "Paul" and "Marx" in lieu of "God"? 
Then, "Marx is dead" and Lenin killed him, but Lenin (like Paul) has been dead for a long 
time too, and the new debate tells us that all that remains is love of neighbour, in a way 
that may have been better understood by Christian doctrine than by either communism or 
socialism. It should be seen as the meek capitulation of a short-lived political ideology 
before a world-historic force that outlasted two millennia (Meier, 2006: 32, seems to agree 
with this assessment). Davis and Riches approach this thought, without fully grasping it, 
thus: 
After the given failure of Soviet scientific materialism and the seeming triumph of 
capitalist hegemony, socialism by its own force must (re)turn to the theological. 
Socialism, as the true and beautiful alternative to capitalist barbarism, must recapture 
the force of its own political desire. To do so, it must finally and irrevocably jettison its 
alliance with modernity, progressivism, and atheism. Socialism’s theological turn is 
necessarily the (re)turn to political desire as spontaneous liberation. It is the 
sanctification of the political body and the redemption of political time (2005: 22). 
This reverse Schmittian operation (a secular concept being theologized) may even be the 
new debate's only claim to formulating something approaching political theology in the 
original sense of the term – although Desmond speaks of such cases as "a counterfeit 
double of the political and a debasement of the theological" (2005: 181). Meier defines 
political theology as "a political theory, political doctrine, or a political position for which, on 
the self-understanding of the political theologian, divine revelation is the supreme authority 
and the ultimate ground" (2006: 29) – which certainly is not the case for much of the new 
debate. Differently from liberation theology and earlier manifestations of Christian political 
theology, the new debate does not translate its "neo-Christian" impulses into praxis (such 
as a praxis of liberation). It seems altogether self-referential, pointless, does not go 
anywhere, has no consequences, and is therefore entirely un-Christian. Its appropriation of 
the term "political theology" must be doubted (if not rejected outright), as all political 
theology certainly must be about praxis first and foremost. Much of the new debate 
appears artificially sustained by bad "theology". 
 Terrorism is a reference that keeps coming up in books, articles and essays of the 
new debate, but no one seems to link the resurgence of political theology explicitly to 
terrorism. Only rarely contributors to the new debate formulate a socio-political analysis: 
In recent years, we have seen increasing attention turn toward the importance, the 
incredible opportunities, and the considerable downsides of globalization, global 
capital, and new technological media, and at the same time an unexpected, 
increasingly unpredictable return of religions – indeed, a turn to the religious – as a 
political factor of worldwide, indeed, global significance. The result seems to be an ever 
more globalized and, I will suggest, 'global' concern with 'religion' – one that is, often, 
dislocated, mediated, mediatized, and virtualized, yet also deprivatized or politicized, 
and whose implications and consequences extend well beyond the assumptions 
concerning differentiation, disenchantment, and rationalization held by most theories of 
modernization, which until recently remained unquestioned (de Vries, 2005: 366). 
Meier sees the "revealed religions" – including both Christianity and Islam – as offering "an 
effective foothold for resisting the global triumph of the union of liberalism and capitalism, 
or rather to present an alternative to the secularism of modernity in its entirety" (2006: 32). 
According to Žižek, "capitalism entails the radical secularization of social life – it 
mercilessly tears apart any aura of authentic nobility, sacredness, honour, and so on" 
(2001: 14). However, Lilla means to detect among those on the left basing their theories 
on Schmitt "a remarkable lack of seriousness ..., whatever their partisan motivations, an 
unwillingness to probe too deeply into his moral universe" and go beyond his references to 
contemporary issues such as, for example, the "dangers of economic globalization" and 
guerrilla warfare (1997: 42). Žižek does offer at least one very sharp observation in the 
best Schmittian tradition: 
It is also crucial to bear in mind the interconnection between the Decalogue (the 
traumatically imposed Divine Commandments) and its modern obverse, the celebrated 
'human Rights'. As the experience of our post-political liberal-permissive society amply 
demonstrates, human Rights are ultimately, at their core, simply Rights to violate the 
Ten Commandments. 'The right to privacy' – the right to adultery, in secret, where no 
one sees me or has the right to probe into my life. 'The right to pursue happiness and 
to possess private property' – the right to steal (to exploit others). 'Freedom of the 
press and of the expression of opinion' – the right to lie. 'The right of free citizens to 
possess weapons' – the right to kill. And, ultimately, 'freedom of religious belief' – the 
right to worship false gods (2001 : 110; his italics). 
In spite of the new debate on political theology, what Jacques Derrida calls "the 
theologico-political" (for example, 2002b: 46; his italics) requires 
a unifying conceptual structure ... that will connect political themes with the history of 
salvation as a whole. Political hermeneutic has to yield theology – and I don't say 'a' 
theology as though any improvisation upon theological themes would do, but 'theology', 
an account of God's dealings which has the authenticity to command Christian faith 
and conscience (O'Donovan, 1996: 22). 
In our day, Milbank succours, political and liberation theologies write forth a "Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, which is precisely the hermeneutic 'capturing' of the text of the Bible" 
whose "rational meaning", recognized already by Spinoza (1997a and 1997b/1670), is "a 
political one, relating to the formal logic of the exercise of ... sovereign power" (Milbank, 
1995: 242). In a time defined by "War On Terror", and an almost constant state of 
emergency (or "exception"), Schmitt's "political theology" has lost nothing of either its 
historic validity or currency. 
 
 
CHAPTER  5:  CONCLUSION 
 
5.1  Radical Islam as a political theology 
 
Schmitt noted that "in the changing friend-enemy-formations of world history theology can 
politically just as well become an object of the revolution as of the counter-revolution" 
(1970: 22; my translation). Metz' definition of political theology is therefore not incompatible 
with Schmitt's. Nor is the appropriation of the mantle of political theology by contributors to 
the new debate entirely without foundation. One doubtlessly could use political theology to 
describe or legitimize decisionist left-wing authoritarian regimes just as much as right-wing 
dictatorships or feudal rule, and a left Schmittian political theology, as recently brought into 
the discussion by some social and political theorists, appears possible.  
 In addition, Böckenförde stresses that political theology is not limited to the realm of 
the Christian religion, but that "there is political theology beyond it" (1983: 16; my 
translation). I hope that my study proved this. Meier further notices, without explicitly 
referring, for example, to the adversity between Christian fundamentalism in the US and 
radical Islam, that 
[o]ne reason why political theology is a controversial concept is that political 
theologians themselves prefer to use it as a weapon in their battles ... it is frequently 
used by other political theologians ... in order to distance themselves from political 
theologians whose political doctrines they disapprove of and to attack any political 
theology that is not grounded in their own faith (2006: 26-27). 
As a hypothesis I assumed that there are clear similarities in some key themes of the 
socio-political analysis of Christian political and liberation theologians and representatives 
of Islamist terrorist movements and radical Islam, respectively – particularly regarding 
"democracy", "capitalism", "globalization", "colonialism", and "underdevelopment". The 
structured presentation of their arguments in, respectively, chapters two and three, and the 
review of the secondary (and some primary) literature in chapter four did show this to be 
true. In the first chapter I announced that if my hypothesis should prove to be well-
founded, I would argue that there is a kind of "political theology" underlying Islamist 
terrorism and radical Islam that can be set in relation to the Christian concepts of political 
theology and theology of liberation, and I will now attempt to expand the term "political 
theology" to cover the socio-political analysis, arguments, and ideology of radical Islam. To 
do so it will be useful to look more closely at some differences and similarities of Christian 
political and liberation theologies and radical Islam and aspects of their respective socio-
political (or politico-theological) analyses. 
 Other writers showed that there are Islamic political and liberation theologies and 
discussed how they interlink with and compare to Christian political theology. Some even 
likened Khomeini's radical Islamic theology to liberation theology (for example, Dorraj, 
1999: 230). In the last chapter it has also become clear that the terrorists quite often refer 
to or appear to be influenced by older (non-violent) traditions of radical Islam. I have 
therefore not exclusively focussed on the violent component of radical Islam, but also 
taken into account earlier and non-violent expressions of this line of thought. Along the 
same lines, I have taken account of instances in which Christian political and liberation 
theologians justify the use of violence or even turned violent themselves in the struggle for 
(political) liberation (for example, in the Philippines and Nicaragua). Liberation theology 
appears particularly prone to the justification of (revolutionary) violence, with many 
liberation theologians advocating it and some taking action. Even the German Moltmann 
supports violent means, though, and Schmitt, proponent of the violence-loaded 
friend/enemy distinction, notoriously joined the National Socialist Party in the early 1930s. 
While I found few authors (theologians or otherwise) who wrote on terrorism and radical 
Islam from an explicitly Christian perspective – and, apart from some slight hints in 
contributions to the new debate, even less who wrote on it in the context of "political 
theology" –, examples of Christian political and liberation theologians' justification of the 
use of violence serve to further highlight the uncanny similarities to radical Islam (and 
possibly terrorism) in analysis, discussion and resolution. "Just as liberation theologians 
justify the use of unauthorized force for the sake of their vision of a moral order" 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 30), so does the ambiguous stance of radical Islam on the use of 
violence, its unequivocal naming of the enemy, and the often experienced difficulty to 
distinguish between (non-violent) radical Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism, 
underline radical Islam's claim to be identified as a political theology.  
 
5.2  Remembrance, solidarity, and praxis 
 
Should we want to agree with Metz that proper theology can be written by non-theologians 
too? If so, the terrorists and ideologues of radical Islam, many of whom are not trained 
theologians, are justified in proclaiming their own theology, devised outside of university 
faculties of Islamic theology, in the midst of a battlefield even. The critics of radical Islam 
advocate a safe, institutionalized theology. The sort of privatized and sanitized religion 
political theologies of all kinds will always be opposed to. Radical Islam remembers the 
"dangerous memory of freedom" (Metz, 1980: 90) that is Muhammad's victory in armed 
struggle over against enemy armies that vastly outnumbered him and his followers. 
Radical Islam also has not forgotten "past suffering". It keeps the "solidarity with the dead 
and those who have been overcome" that Metz demands of a true political theology (57). 
The terrorists' recurrent references to the crusades, for example, keep alive the memory of 
those who stood in the jihad before them and succumbed to the Christian "enemy". The 
West's "War On Terror", a Schmittian all-out war for geopolitical domination and arguably 
"universal" Western values – which is seen by radical Muslims as only a new "Crusader 
War" (MEMRI, 2002b: par. 2) –,  equals what the terrorists call jihad or "Holy War". It is the 
same war. In usual openness, the Al Muhajiroun website states its belief that: "There is 
such a great emphasis of [sic] this subject, that some commentators and scholars of the 
Quran have remarked that the topic of the Quran is Jihad" (2004b: par. 9). 
 The terrorists do not use the term, or concept of, "underdevelopment". This stands in 
sharp contrast to claims in much of the secondary literature that attributes the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism to social and economic deprivation. Being anti-capitalists, radical 
Islamists do not compare their lands to the West in economic terms per se, it appears. If 
anything, terrorists boast of the oil-riches of the Middle East, and deplore Western 
influence and neo-colonialism and global economic governance structures that hinder 
them from enjoying the wealth of their countries.  
 Radical Islam gains much of its influence from the social activities that follow on from 
its socio-political analysis. In line with what Metz calls a political theology "that operates 
subject to the primacy of praxis" (1980: 50) – the latter consisting of "communication and 
action" (51) –, not subordinating "praxis to theory" (50), "an extensive network" of Islamic 
and Islamist organizations, particularly in the Middle East, engages in the provision of 
basic "health, welfare, educational, and other services" to deprived, mainly urban 
populations, they run "orphanages" and retirement homes, "hospitals, ... clinics, ... Islamic 
schools, ... Koranic study centers" and Islamic universities, but also "paid particular 
attention ... to expanding Islamic influence in state schools". Radical Islamists formed 
"student unions, youth organizations, and religious, social, and educational associations". 
As a result, they "brought into existence an Islamic 'civil society' which paralleled, 
surpassed, and often supplanted in scope and activity the frequently frail institutions of 
secular civil society" and filled a "vacuum" left by governments, caring for "a large number 
of ... poor" (Huntington, 1996: 111-113). This movement could be said to find its equivalent 
in the Christian ecclesiastic base communities of Latin America and some parts of Asia 
that have become commonly associated with liberation theology (see, for example, Löwy, 
1996: 48-49; Gutiérrez, 1993: xix, xli; Segundo, 1996: 190; Kim, 1987a: par. 126). 
[T]he Christian-based communities also function as self-reliance, self-help 
organizations. In this capacity, they focus on matters such as literacy and health care. 
These alternative sources of education, cooperation, mobilization and power have their 
counterparts among Muslims (Dorraj, 1999: 232). 
The Islamic and Islamist organizations seem to answer, for Muslims, the question 
Moltmann posed thus: 
What would it be like if just once the time were to come when one did not receive 
negative answers to the question what is a Christian; that is, that he is one that does 
not do this or that, but instead, a positive answer ...?! What would it be like if the time 
were to come when men would say, as they did about the Christians in old Rome, that 
they feed not only their poor but the entire city? (1973: 62) 
At the same time, political theology seems to be always reactionary, never pro-active. Not 
only does Schmitt frequently refer back to writers of the counterrevolution such as Donoso 
Cortés, Bonald, and de Maistre, his political theology and many of his other early writings 
were devised in reaction to the experience of World War One and the Russian Revolution. 
The second wave of political theology (Metz and Moltmann, liberation theologies, and 
radical Islam) resulted from the end of colonialism and the emerging new world order. The 
third wave, the new debate of our time, can be seen as a reaction to September 11, the 
end of the Soviet Union, and new friend/enemy divides opening up. 
 The resurgence of interest in political theology, among intellectuals of the political 
left, most of them clearly influenced by postmodernism, reveals another interesting fact: 
political theology is inherently positivist. It does not lend itself easily to a postmodern 
treatment as, in most of its expressions, it is set on effecting social and political change. 
Even according to Žižek, "'postmodern' individuals" – "today's Last Men" –, will "dedicate 
their life to a survival replete with more and more refined and artificially excited/aroused 
small pleasures" and "reject all 'higher' goals as terrorist" (2003: 39). However, as already 
indicated, the further left political theology moves, the less substance, generally speaking, 
there is and the more (empty) sentiment. 
 
5.3  Anti-liberalism and democracy 
 
I suggested that representatives of terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda see an intrinsic 
linkage between democracy and capitalism and that they operate from the premises that 
whoever wants to fight capitalism, and maybe sees globalization as today's primary 
manifestation of it, needs to abandon democracy and its values first. Whoever wants to 
fight capitalism, it appears, needs to fight democracy as well. In contrast to this, as has 
been shown, Christian "political theology" often aims at establishing democratic and 
humane conditions where no such exist. Many of its proponents assume that a non-
capitalist democracy is possible. This very notion, in spite of political theologians' arguing 
for a political role of religion, is based on Western secularism and the separation of politics 
and religion that is possible in Christianity but is arguably not possible in Islam.  
 Schmitt's entire politico-theological concept of the analogy between religious beliefs 
and political organization of any given society seems to be founded on the assumption that 
state and religion are separate entities. This idea is not necessarily secular, though, as it is 
inherent already in Augustine's teaching of Civitas Dei and Civitas Terrena and before that 
in Jesus' command to "repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar" (USCCB, 1970: Luke 
20:25). Also, that simple distinction seems to be blurring in the West, with ever more non-
state political actors appearing on the stage. Nevertheless, one might be led to ask 
whether the composite term "political theology" does make sense in a context that refuses 
to distinguish between politics and religion (or that has no concept of such a separation), 
or if indeed the concept of political theology presupposes a Western mindset? Not so. In 
Schmittian terms, Allah is sovereign in (radical) Islam, and political legitimacy is gained 
from adherence to "Allah's rule". Jihad may be defined as the "state of emergency" that is 
central to Schmitt's concept of political theology. In a state of emergency all means are 
fair. (And radical Islam appears to be living in a near permanent state of emergency.) 
Schmitt's insights help to explain why democracy stands little chance in Muslim countries. 
It is hard to view democracy as in any way analogous to Muslim societies' prevalent 
religious beliefs. This would seem to indicate that while democratic governments may be 
compatible with Western political theology, Islamic political theology has greater affinity 
with authoritarian regimes. 
  What then is the single most important factor responsible for the similarities we 
detected in the socio-political analyses of Christian political and liberation theologies and 
radical Islam? Political theology, as we were told frequently, stands in opposition to the 
privatized religion of liberal western societies. Not only that, though. The major finding of 
this research is that all genuine and developed political theologies appear to be inherently 
anti-liberal. This seems to be next to unavoidable. Schmitt is as anti-liberal as are Metz, 
Moltmann, the liberation theologians, and radical Islamists. The particular expression of 
anti-liberalism is of course always contextualized. Schmitt's main thrust is directed against 
the empty pretensions of parliamentarism that he saw as synonymous with the liberal 
democracy of the Weimar Republic. Radical Islam, on the other hand, is set against 
neoliberal globalization and the world domination of "Democracy/Capitalism" (Al 
Muhajiroun, 2004f: par. 7). Political theology can be applied to all struggles against 
liberalism, capitalism, and associated phenomena – even in societies that are not liberal 
themselves, as was often the case in liberation theology with its evocation of dependency 
theory (it is of course odd, but not to be doubted, that liberation theology should be anti-
liberal). The new debate in leftist circles arose as an alternative anti-liberal option after 
communism and socialism had been discredited. 
 Anti-liberalism thus is at the basis of political theology. This fact would explain why, 
although earlier attempts at formulating the relationship of politics and religion have clearly 
been made, "political theology" as such only really arose once liberalism had taken hold. 
Only after liberalism had become the dominant ideology could political theology take a 
stance against it. Such a sequence of theoretical developments seems corroborated by the 
fact that a key event of the early stages of pro-democratic liberalism was the French 
revolution, and Schmitt bases his political theology on the thought of writers of the 
counterrevolution. 
 Anti-liberal political theology even seems able to overcome the political left/right 
divide. Political theologians arrived at anti-liberal political theologies from the right (Schmitt, 
Christian fundamentalism, some forms of Jewish political theology), the left (Metz, 
liberation theology, the new debate), and from outside the democratic spectrum altogether 
(radical Islam).  
 Often anti-liberalism leads to political theology being anti-democratic as well. If one 
assumes, as I do, that a non-liberal democracy is not possible (that is, that every kind of 
democracy inevitably leads to some form of capitalism), then being anti-liberal means 
being (at least potentially) anti-democratic as well. Schmitt's biography seems exemplary 
and consequential. While Schmitt initially argued against liberalism rather than democracy 
per se, the threshold for him to support a decisionist anti-democratic regime was low. In 
many cases Latin American liberation theologians started out from a position of 
conscientious non-violence and critical support of democracy, but gradually became 
apologetic of violent means and supportive of revolutionary movements that would enact 
"justice" outside of formal democratic processes. This is one thing the contributors to the 
new debate have yet to learn (but in doing so their closeness to Marxism will assist them 
greatly): they still seem to hold on to some socialist ideal of a non-liberal democracy (or 
"neighbourhood") and want to use political theology as a means to get there. That is naïve. 
Radical Islam is truest to the essence of political theology in its outright damnation of both 
liberalism and democracy. 
 The only exceptions from the rule are some avowedly pro-liberal Islamic liberation 
theologies (Esack's, for example, resulting from the struggle against the anti-liberal 
apartheid government in South Africa). These minor political or liberation theologies have 
however not been theoretically developed in any meaningful manner, and cannot be taken 
as sufficient evidence against an underlying anti-liberal principle of all political theology. 
 
5.4  Future lines of inquiry 
 
I set out to argue that radical Islam can justifiably be called a "political theology". In order 
to substantiate my claim, I elaborated on radical Islam's understanding of theology and 
politics. I showed that radical Islam agrees with the definitions of political theology 
stipulated by writers such as Schmitt and Metz, and that there is a social engagement 
accompanying it similar to that of liberation theology. Radical Islam is as anti-liberal as 
other forms of political theology. My proposition is therefore that radical Islam from now on 
be seen unequivocally as a political theology and treated as such. 
 This opens up various lines for future academic inquiry into, and the (comparative) 
study of, political theology – as well as for the theoretical development of political theology 
to meet the constantly evolving requirements of the 21st century. An interesting question 
that should be addressed is, for example, whether one could imagine a multi-religious 
political theology – either based on a multicultural nation-state or at the global level?  
 Other questions to be addressed may include the (contested) nature of political 
theology as political theory; its place in political research rather than just in theology; 
reasons, consequences, and meaning of the clash of political theologies (particularly 
Christian fundamentalism and radical Islam) that we have been experiencing for some 
years; the role of the new debate within (academic) theology, within religion, within the 
community of the faithful, and within the Catholic Church and other churches; and possible 
inferences from the new debate that would enrich theology. A common definition or 
framework covering all forms of political and liberation theologies has thus far proven 
elusive, but does not need to remain so. Further inquiries into the apparently inherent 
linkage between anti-liberal (possibly even anti-democratic) thought or sentiment and all 
(major) political theologies may provide valuable pointers for such an enterprise. For 
example, why is anti-liberalism conducive for political theologies to develop? Is it because 
liberalism is, in its turn, inherently anti-religious? It can certainly not be said that anti-
liberalism is necessarily pro-religion, as there are plenty of examples to the contrary 
(communism, National Socialism, etc.). Along the same lines, it needs to be established 
whether political theology does have the properties to permanently overcome the political 
left/right divide and find an epistemological and eschatological location outside the 
democratic spectrum. 
 Finally, the most serious question that arises may be whether (comparative) political 
theology could replace political theory and/or religion in the approaching end phase of 
Spengler's Decline of the west. He predicts that in the final stages of Western civilization 
ideological concepts, such as Marxism, and theories will loose their meaning – "and their 
end comes not from refutation, but from boredom" (1971/22: II/454) –, power politics will 
reaffirm itself over the vanishing forces of capitalism (II/465, 506), and there will be a rise 
of religious belief: "In the midst of the land lie the old world-cities, empty receptacles of an 
extinguished soul, in which a historyless mankind slowly nests itself". "And while in high 
places there is eternal alternance of victory and defeat, those in the depths pray, pray with 
that mighty piety of the Second Religiousness that has overcome all doubts for ever" 
(II/435). 
 Comparative political theology may be the ultimate political theory to explain all this.  
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